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CATEGORICALLY BLACK, WHITE, OR WRONG:
“MISPERCEPTION DISCRIMINATION” AND THE STATE
OF TITLE VII PROTECTION
D. Wendy Greene*
This Article exposes an inconspicuous, categorically wrong movement within an-
tidiscrimination law. A band of federal courts have denied Title VII protection to
individuals who allege “categorical discrimination”: invidious, differential treat-
ment on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, or sex. Per these courts, a
plaintiff who self-identifies as Christian but is misperceived as Muslim cannot as-
sert an actionable claim under Title VII if she suffers an adverse employment
action as a result of this misperception and related animus. Though Title VII
expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, courts have held that
such a plaintiff’s claim of “misperception discrimination” is beyond Title VII’s
scope. Accordingly, Title VII protection is only extended to such a plaintiff if she is
“actually” Muslim or brings forth allegations of invidious, differential treatment
based upon her actual Christian identity. This Article argues that these judicially
created prerequisites to Title VII protection are categorically wrong. They impose a
new “actuality requirement” on Title VII plaintiffs in intentional discrimination
cases that engenders unfathomable results. Plaintiffs who suffer from invidious,
differential treatment animated by either their self-ascribed or misperceived protected
status will be denied statutory protection against discrimination if they fail to prove
their actual religious, gender, ethnic, racial, or color identity upon defendant-em-
ployers’ challenge.
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Though this Article primarily examines the imposition of an actuality requirement
in mispercepion discrimination cases, this Article also demonstrates that courts
have considered and imposed an actuality requirement in conventionally framed
discrimination cases as well. Accordingly, this Article is the first to enumerate the
development of, and myriad justifications for, the actuality requirement in cases of
categorical discrimination. This Article argues that some courts’ imposition of an
actuality requirement in misperception and conventionally framed discrimination
cases denotes the birth of an unorthodox interpretation of Title VII’s reach and
meaning nearly fifty years after its enactment—an interpretative methodology that
this Article is first to describe as “anti-anticlassificationist.”
This Article also highlights a few critical, negative implications of courts’ anti-
anticlassificationist interpretation of antidiscrimination law. Namely, it examines
the emergence of a minimalist “actuality defense” and resulting identity adjudica-
tion, which obfuscates the chief issue in intentional discrimination cases: whether
the plaintiff suffered unlawful, invidious, differential treatment. Additionally, this
Article illuminates that courts’ anti-anticlassificationist interpretation and attend-
ant actuality requirement have in fact resuscitated age-old trials of racial
determination. They have thereby produced an additional destructive consequence
by reifying race as a stable, biological construct. Consequently, this Article proposes
fresh, practical, and theoretical interventions to cease the continued anti-anticlas-
sificationist interpretation of Title VII. In doing so, this Article excavates
previously unexplored Title VII statutory provisions, longstanding EEOC direc-
tives, Fifth and Third Circuit precedent, and recent Supreme Court precedent.
Properly read, these sources will show that a prerequisite showing of actuality in
cases of categorical discrimination under Title VII is wrong. Thus, this Article
affirms that all categorical discrimination plaintiffs—that is, all individuals who
have allegedly suffered discriminatory treatment on the basis of their actual or mis-
taken religious, gender, ethnic, racial, or color identity—are entitled to vindicate
their statutory rights to be free from unlawful discrimination.
INTRODUCTION
John has a caramel brown complexion, green eyes, and dark,
wavy hair.1 Since he began working for his employer, John’s co-
workers have consistently aimed derogatory names and comments
at him. Everyday they call him a “wetback” and “an illegal,” and they
instruct him “to go back to Mexico.” Instead of John, his co-workers
call him “Juan Valdez.” At least once, John also arrived to his work
cubicle only to be greeted with pictures of a man named “Juan”
with a noose around his neck and an attached note that reads, “Go
1. John’s narrative is fictional, yet based upon a composite of actual misperception
discrimination cases. See, e.g., Burrage v. FedEx Freight, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-2755, 2012 WL
1068794 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012); Daniels v. Essex Grp., Inc., 937 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.
1991).
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back where you came from!” John has complained to his supervisor
about his co-workers’ comments and the picture depicting his
lynching. He has explained, to no avail, that his co-workers are
harassing him because they misperceive him to be of Mexican ori-
gin. To John’s knowledge, he does not have any Mexican ancestry;
he, his parents, and his grandparents have self-identified as Black,2
non-Hispanic. Even when he reported the offensive conduct to his
supervisor, his supervisor responded, “Well, you do look Mexican,”
and continued to call him “Juan Valdez” alongside other
employees.
John believes that he is the victim of racial harassment and is
thinking seriously about suing his employer for racial discrimina-
tion.  Seemingly, John is experiencing what this Article deems
“categorical discrimination”—invidious, differential treatment on
the basis of race or another protected characteristic3—and he
should have a colorable claim of discrimination under Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.4 However, a disturbing, counterintuitive
development is transpiring within the federal judiciary. It is quite
plausible that a court would conclude that, based upon his specific
allegations of race-based invidious treatment, John cannot seek re-
lief under the federal antidiscrimination laws that prohibit race
discrimination in the workplace.
Though it is commonly understood that Title VII makes it unlaw-
ful for employers to treat individuals invidiously and differentially
2. Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw has explained that “Black” deserves capitalization be-
cause “Blacks, like Asians [and] Latinos . . . constitute a specific cultural group and, as such,
require denotation as a proper noun.” Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Re-
trenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331,
1332 n.2 (1988) (citing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An
Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 515, 516 (1982)). Additionally,
Professor Neil Gotanda contends that the capitalization of Black is appropriate as it “has
deep political and social meaning as a liberating term.” Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our
Constitution is Colorblind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 n.12 (1991). I agree with both Professors
Crenshaw and Gotanda and, for both reasons, throughout this Article when I reference peo-
ple of African descent individually and collectively, the word Black will be represented as a
proper noun.
3. John could also assert claims of national origin and/or color discrimination under
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
4. Though this Article primarily addresses discrimination cases arising under Title VII,
it is important to note that it is equally plausible that a plaintiff like John would not have a
colorable race or national origin discrimination claim under similar federal antidiscrimina-
tion laws like § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which has been interpreted to prohibit
intentional race discrimination in the employment context. See infra Part IV.B (examining a
§ 1981 race discrimination case in which the court held that, in order to maintain their
lawsuit, plaintiffs would have to “prove” that they were Native American at trial).
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on the basis of race, religion, sex, national origin, and color,5 a num-
ber of federal courts have rejected this interpretation of Title VII’s
scope in cases of “misperception discrimination.”6 In cases like
John’s, courts have imposed an “actuality requirement” for Title VII
protection. According to these courts, only intentional discrimina-
tion claims based upon an individual’s actual protected status are
cognizable under Title VII. Therefore, John can benefit from Title
VII’s protection against intentional race discrimination only if he is
in fact of Mexican descent or if he brings forth specific allegations
of invidious, differential treatment because of his Black, non-His-
panic ancestry.7
This result is illogical and inequitable. John’s case does not pre-
sent claims of discrimination that are any less injurious or
remediable than if he were to maintain a conventionally framed
employment discrimination case in which he alleged discriminatory
treatment because of his self-identified Black, non-Hispanic racial
identity. Accordingly, this Article posits that plaintiffs in mispercep-
tion discrimination cases, like plaintiffs in conventionally framed
cases, are asserting allegations of invidious, differential treatment
on the basis of Title VII’s proscribed characteristics. In other words,
5. See, e.g., Taken v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1369 (10th Cir. 1997) (“The
principal goal of Title VII is to eliminate discrimination in employment based on differences
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”) (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardi-
son, 432 U.S. 63, 71 & n.6 (1977)); Lightner v. City of Wilmington, 545 F.3d 260, 264 (4th
Cir. 2008) (“Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of specifically enumerated
grounds: ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’ [The statute’s] purpose to eliminate
these invidious forms of discrimination is clear.”) (citation omitted).
6. This Article delineates that all discrimination is the manifestation of one’s percep-
tions, related animus, or stereotypes about the victim of discrimination. Therefore, the
descriptor, “misperception discrimination,” simply refers to instances whereby the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant misperceived her identity, or rather that the defendant’s percep-
tions do not correlate with the plaintiff’s self-perception or self-ascribed identity, and that the
plaintiff suffered invidious, differential treatment stemming from the defendant’s percep-
tions. See infra Part II.A.
7. Classifications as “Black” or “Mexican” are not mutually exclusive racial or ethnic
identities. Though discussed less often, one who may identify as Hispanic and/or of Mexican
ancestry may also have African ancestry and therefore identify as Afro-Mexican, Afro-Chi-
cana, Afro-Hispanic, or Afro-Latina. See generally Tanya Katerı́ Hernández, Afro-Mexicans and
the Chicano Movement: The Unknown Story, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1537 (2004). See also generally Taunya
Lovell Banks, Mestizaje and the Mexican Mestizo Self: No Hay Sangre Negra, So There Is No Black-
ness, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 199 (2006) (discussing the marginalization of Afro-Mexicans
and African ancestry within the paradigm of Mexico’s mixed-race or “mestizaje” identity de-
spite Mexico’s dealings with African slavery); LAURA E. GÓMEZ, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE
MAKING OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN RACE 50 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2007) (“During the first century
of Spanish conquest of Mexico, there were about as many African slaves brought to Mexico as
Spaniards who emigrated there . . . [and] [o]ver time, African slaves mixed with Spaniards,
Indians, and mestizos (people of Indian and Spanish ancestry) in Mexico to produce a ra-
cially mixed population.”).
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they have been subjected to “categorical discrimination.” Thus, mis-
perception discrimination plaintiffs are likewise entitled to statutory
protection against unlawful discrimination in the workplace.
This Article demonstrates that courts’ adoption of an actuality
requirement in Title VII cases is categorically wrong. It represents a
counterproductive, contrary, and disconcerting position within an-
tidiscrimination law that, if left unexamined and unchallenged, can
easily result in a wholesale lack of relief for victims of discriminatory
treatment of the very nature that Congress meant to eliminate from
the workplace. Moreover, in light of increased immigration, cul-
tural diversity, interracial marriage, and transracial adoption, as
well as the formal recognition of multi-racial identity and more
fluid self-characterizations of racial, ethnic, religious, and gender
identity, claims stemming from misperceptions about a plaintiff’s
protected status may become as commonplace as traditional claims
of discrimination based upon an individual’s self-classified identity.
Continued application of an actuality requirement in intentional
discrimination cases not only fails to respond to these real and
ongoing demographic changes in American society but can also en-
gender pervasive discrimination on the basis of race, religion,
national origin, color, and sex in contemporary workplaces. Conse-
quently, many individuals will be left without protection against
categorical discrimination within Title VII’s meaning and reach.
Additionally, imposition of an actuality requirement in categori-
cal discrimination cases not only inflicts obvious injury on
discrimination plaintiffs but also yields unexpected repercussions
for antidiscrimination law theory, policy, and praxis, which this Arti-
cle illuminates and aims to remedy. Overall, this Article seeks to
end this narrow interpretation of antidiscrimination law generally
and Title VII more specifically, which has fast become the predomi-
nant interpretive methodology in misperception discrimination
cases and has also been employed in conventionally framed dis-
crimination cases. Part I of this Article briefly outlines Title VII’s
protections and prohibitions. Part II details the development of an
implicit and express espousal of an actuality requirement in inten-
tional discrimination cases in which plaintiffs contended that their
employers’ misperceptions about their race, national origin, and/
or religion motivated adverse employment actions, such as harass-
ment or termination.
Part III investigates courts’ reasoning for adopting an actuality
requirement and argues that these judicial decisions are based on
an unsettling misinterpretation of Title VII. Primarily, these courts
have reasoned that, unlike the Americans with Disabilities Act
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(ADA), which expressly affords protection to individuals discrimi-
nated against because of their perceived identity, Title VII protects
against discrimination because of an individual’s actual identity.
Yet, by adopting an actuality requirement in Title VII cases, federal
courts have patently disregarded the indelible nexus between em-
ployer perception and the resulting invidious, differential
treatment, a relationship that courts recognize in ADA cases. Per
these courts, to recognize misperception discrimination in the Title
VII context would expand statutory protection to a new class of in-
dividuals whom Congress did not intend to protect.
Seemingly, the actuality requirement advanced in misperception
discrimination cases also derives from a literal interpretation of the
plain language of Title VII’s substantive provision, which prohibits
discrimination “because of such individual’s race, sex, national ori-
gin, color, and religion.”8 More precisely, however, Part III
continues by positing that the development of an actuality require-
ment is the product of an excessively rigid application of the
protected class approach first adopted by the Supreme Court in Mc-
Donnell Douglas v. Green.9 Courts’ intransigence represents a
disturbing interpretative methodology that this Article terms an
“anti-anticlassificationist” interpretation of Title VII. This approach
rejects one of the conventionally accepted purposes of Title VII: to
prohibit all decision making on the basis of Title VII’s proscribed
traits, whether benign or invidious, in furtherance of a norm of in-
dividual fairness.10
Part IV examines the alarming, counterproductive implications
of courts’ anti-anticlassificationist interpretation and attendant cre-
ation of an actuality mandate in intentional discrimination cases.
Part IV.A explores the creation of a minimalist “actuality defense.”
Part IV.B discusses the emergence of identity adjudication in all in-
tentional discrimination cases. It then details the reality of racial
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
9. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (holding that the
plaintiff, who identified himself as Black, established the initial element of a prima facie case
of intentional race discrimination by demonstrating that he belonged to a “racial minority”
group). Thereafter, lower courts interpreted the initial prima facie element articulated in
McDonnell Douglas as requiring a showing of membership within a protected class or a pro-
tected group. See generally Nancy Levit, Changing Workforce Demographics and the Future of the
Protected Class Approach, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 463 (2012) (providing a critique of the
protected class approach in light of demographic changes within American workplaces).
10. Though legal academics have proposed and identified a number of perspectives ap-
propriated by courts when interpreting Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws, the
anticlassificationist and antisubordinationist approaches are largely represented within these
academic debates as the chief, conventional methodologies used to interpret antidiscrimina-
tion laws. See generally Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003).
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determination litigation in contemporary race discrimination
cases11 and the continued reification of a discredited view of race as
a fixed, biological construct. Thus, Part IV.B exposes the implica-
tions of an actuality requirement and posits that the creation of an
actuality defense and the inundation of identity adjudication in
both conventionally framed and misperception discrimination cases
obfuscate the chief issue in such cases: whether the plaintiff suf-
fered invidious, differential treatment on proscribed grounds.
Part V proffers a number of practical and theoretical interven-
tions that practitioners, jurists, and legal scholars have not fully
explored, yet which are critical in quelling further impairment of
Title VII’s meaning, protection, and efficacy. Specifically, Part V.A
unveils the under-examined Fifth Circuit precedent of EEOC v. WC
& M Enterprises12 and EEOC guidance. Both of these precedents
recognize misperception discrimination cases, reject an actuality re-
quirement in Title VII intentional discrimination cases, and
embrace the fact that subjective perceptions about a discrimination
victim’s protected status animate the invidious, differential treat-
ment from which she suffers. Part V.B provides additional
underexplored jurisprudential support for the cessation of an actu-
ality requirement in Title VII cases via its examination of Fogleman v.
Mercy Hospital.13 In that case, the Third Circuit expressly legitimized
misperception discrimination cases and acknowledged the inter-
connectedness of employer perceptions and the resulting
discrimination in the Title VII context.
In Part V.C, this Article posits that, like the Third Circuit in Fogel-
man, the Supreme Court in Thompson v. North American Stainless,
LP14 implicitly denounced a showing of actuality as a prerequisite to
maintain a Title VII action. Consequently, all categorical discrimi-
nation plaintiffs—despite the fact that the alleged discriminatory
treatment they experienced may have emanated from their self-
ascribed or mistaken identity—have standing to maintain a cause of
action under Title VII. In both instances, plaintiffs assert claims of
discrimination clearly “within the zones of interests protected by
Title VII” and are “persons aggrieved” by a covered employer’s un-
lawful employment practices. Thus, satisfying an actuality
requirement should not be required for plaintiffs in conventionally
11. Identity adjudication could also occur in cases of religion, national origin, and sex
discrimination. See infra notes 167, 263.
12. 496 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2007).
13. 283 F.3d 561 (3d Cir. 2002).
14. 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
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framed or misperception discrimination cases to vindicate their stat-
utory rights to be free from racial, religious, color, national origin,
and sex discrimination in the workplace.
I. TITLE VII OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT:
ITS PROHIBITIONS AND PROTECTIONS
In 1964, during the heart of the modern civil rights movement,
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act, which is one of the most no-
table pieces of civil rights legislation to date. Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act proscribes discrimination on the basis of race and
color15 and was designed to address pervasive racial discrimination
in the sector of private employment.16 Congress also forbade dis-
crimination based upon sex, national origin, and religion.17
Accordingly, in Section 703(a) of Title VII, Congress has made it
unlawful for an employer employing fifteen or more employees:18
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin; or to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.19
Title VII further provides that an employer violates the Act when-
ever a plaintiff “demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
15. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (2006)).
16. Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” Discrimination
Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 806 & n.6 (1994) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2556
(1964) (remarks of Congressman Celler) (“You must remember that the basic purpose of
Title VII is to prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of race or color.”) (emphasis
added)).
17. Civil Rights Act § 703; see also Perea, supra note 16.
18. Title VII originally defined an “employer” as any entity “engaged in an industry af-
fecting commerce who has twenty-five or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” Civil Rights Act
§ 701, 78 Stat. at 253. This was later changed to fifteen or more employees. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (2006).
19. Civil Rights Act § 703(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)).
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national origin was a motivating factor for any employment prac-
tice.”20 Therefore, Title VII expressly protects individuals against
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin discrimination both
before and during the employment relationship.21
Title VII also protects applicants and employees who have op-
posed an unlawful employment practice or participated in an
investigation22 related to such discrimination from employer retalia-
tion.23 Specifically, Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating
“against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . .
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employ-
ment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”24
An individual who claims that an employer has discriminated
against her because of a prohibited basis enumerated in the statute
is a “person aggrieved” under Title VII and is permitted to file a
charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).25 If the EEOC decides not to sue the em-
ployer, Title VII permits an individual aggrieved by a prohibited
employment practice to initiate a civil action against the em-
ployer.26 Though Congress did not provide a statutory definition of
a “person aggrieved,” a little over a decade after Title VII’s enact-
ment, the Supreme Court made clear that Title VII was “design[ed]
as a comprehensive solution for the problem of invidious discrimi-
nation in employment.”27 A “person aggrieved” includes, at a
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). But see id. § 2000e-2(e) (providing that an employer does
not violate Title VII when its consideration of national origin, religion, or sex in an employ-
ment decision is a “bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the particular business or enterprise”).
21. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (holding that former employ-
ees were also included under the statutory term “employees” and are thereby able to
maintain an actionable retaliation claim against former employers who are covered under
Title VII).
22. At least five federal courts of appeals require a claimant to file a charge of discrimi-
nation with the EEOC or a similar enforcement agency or participate in investigatory
proceedings before the EEOC or parallel state or local enforcement agency for the extension
of protection under the participation clause. See Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537,
543 (6th Cir. 2003); EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000);
Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc. 209 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2000); Brower v. Runyon, 178
F.3d 1002, 1005–07 (8th Cir. 1999); Vasconcelos v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1990).
23. The Supreme Court held that an employer’s action against a plaintiff constitutes
unlawful retaliation when such an action is considered “materially adverse” or materially inju-
rious or harmful to an objectively reasonable employee in the plaintiff’s position. Burlington
N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67–73 (2006).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
25. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
26. Id. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1).
27. Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (emphasis added).
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minimum, an individual who suffers invidious, differential treat-
ment (1) on the basis of Title VII’s protected categories or (2) in
retaliation for protected conduct at the hands of a covered em-
ployer.28 As this Article later demonstrates, such a person is thereby
entitled to assert her statutory right to protection from discrimina-
tion on the basis of Title VII’s proscribed grounds.
However, a band of federal district courts and at least one federal
court of appeals have adopted an actuality requirement in Title VII
cases of intentional discrimination emanating from an employer’s
misperceptions about the plaintiff’s racial, ethnic, or religious iden-
tity.29 By extension, this actuality requirement also applies to Title
VII intentional discrimination cases on the basis of color or sex.30
Misperception discrimination plaintiffs have alleged that they suf-
fered a hostile work environment and other adverse employment
actions, such as termination, because their employers have mis-
perceived their identities. The Supreme Court has articulated
28. See Thompson v. Am. Stainless Steel, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 869–70 (2011) (holding that
the employee protected against retaliation need not be the applicant or the employee who
opposed the discriminatory conduct or participated in a proceeding relating to alleged dis-
crimination under Title VII); infra Part V.C.
29. See, e.g., Burrage v. FedEx Freight, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-2755, 2012 WL 1068794 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 29, 2012); El v. Max Daetwyler Corp., No. 3:09-CV-415, 2011 WL 1769805
(W.D.N.C. May 9, 2011), aff’d, 451 Fed. App’x 257 (4th Cir. 2011); Adler v. Evanston Nw.
Healthcare Corp., No. 07-C-4203, 2008 WL 5272455 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2008); Lopez-Galvan v.
Mens Warehouse, Civil No. 3:06-CV-537, 2008 WL 2705604 (W.D.N.C. July 10, 2008); Uddin
v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., CIVA 1:05-CV-1115-TWT, 2006 WL 1835291 (N.D. Ga. June
30, 2006); EEOC v. WC & M Enter., Inc., No. Civ.A. H-04-3372, 2005 WL 2106090 (S.D. Tex.
2005), rev’d, 496 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2007); Butler v. Potter, 345 F. Supp. 2d 844 (E.D. Tenn.
2004); see also McIntosh v. Ill. Dep’t. of Emp’t. Sec., No. 05-C-7044, 2007 WL 1958577 (N.D.
Ill. July 2, 2007) (holding that a plaintiff who was born in the United States and self-identified
as African American could not support her national origin discrimination claim on the
ground that she was misperceived as Hispanic because she spoke Spanish in the workplace
unless the plaintiff could demonstrate she was “actually” Hispanic since speaking Spanish did
not necessarily signify her “actual” country of origin or race). Examination of available court
documents and opinions reveals that the parties involved did not present the EEOC gui-
dance on misperception discrimination to the courts, and the courts did not investigate sua
sponte the EEOC’s guidance on this issue.
30. In Uddin v. Universal Avionics Systems Corp., for example, the court adopted an actual-
ity requirement in a Title VII case alleging religious and misperception race and national
origin discrimination. 2006 WL 1835291 at *6. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s race and
national origin discrimination claims yet denied summary judgment on plaintiff’s religious
discrimination claim. Id. at *4–7. In furtherance of a prima facie actuality mandate, the Uddin
court granted the plaintiff his day in court on the religious discrimination claim and on a
color discrimination claim, which the court raised sua sponte. Id. at *7, *6 n.3. According to
the court, Mr. Uddin established a presumption of color and religious discrimination be-
cause he was “in actuality” Muslim, his skin complexion was “in actuality” dark, and he was
replaced by a white Christian. Id. at *6. In so doing, the Uddin court extended an actuality
requirement to Title VII color discrimination claims.
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various frameworks for courts to use in such intentional discrimina-
tion cases. In McDonnell Douglas v. Green Corp.,31 the Supreme Court
promulgated a tripartite analytical framework to be utilized in dis-
parate treatment cases in which the plaintiff is unable to proffer
“direct”32 evidence or an admission from the defendant that the
proscribed characteristic is the reason for the adverse employment
action. According to the Supreme Court, plaintiffs can raise a re-
buttable presumption of discrimination by first putting forth a
prima facie case that establishes that, more likely than not, a pro-
scribed criterion was the reason for the alleged adverse
employment action.33 In McDonnell Douglas, the Court held that
plaintiffs could establish a prima facie case of race discrimination
by demonstrating:
(i) that he belong[ed] to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons
of complainant’s qualifications.34
According to McDonnell Douglas, once a plaintiff raises a viable
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant-employer to
rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing, through ad-
missible evidence, a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the
31. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Lapsley v. Columbia University-College of Physicians &
Surgeons, 999 F. Supp. 506, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), for a discussion of the original conception
for the McDonnell Douglas framework. In 1989, the Supreme Court developed an additional
analytical framework for disparate treatment cases in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989). Per Price Waterhouse, if the plaintiff proves that a protected characteristic was a sub-
stantial factor in the challenged employment action, the burden shifts to the defendant to
prove that it would have made the same decision even had it not considered the protected
characteristic. Id. at 250.  After Price Waterhouse, Congress adopted an amended “mixed mo-
tive” analytical framework for proving disparate treatment cases. See Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006)).
The plaintiff must prove that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor for the chal-
lenged employment action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Upon a plaintiff making this
showing, the defendant bears the burden of proving that it would have taken the same action
even had it not considered the protected characteristic. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The Su-
preme Court, however, has not expressly overruled McDonnell Douglas.  Therefore, in this
Article, I limit my discussion of proving discrimination via circumstantial evidence to the
McDonnell Douglas framework.
32. “The classic notion of ‘direct evidence’ is evidence that, if believed, proves the ulti-
mate question at issue without drawing any inferences.” MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 29 (7th ed. 2008).
33. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
34. Id.
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alleged adverse employment action.35 Once the employer has pro-
duced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to demon-
strate that the employer’s alleged motivation is a pretext. That is,
the plaintiff must present persuasive evidence either that the em-
ployer’s asserted reason is false or that the employer’s underlying
motivation for the adverse employment action was, more likely than
not, discriminatory.36
Though not expressly contemplated in Title VII’s statutory lan-
guage, the Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
interpreted Section 703(a) as prohibiting not only “economic” or
“tangible” employment actions like a denial of benefits or termina-
tion, but also intangible employment actions such as creating a
racially or religiously hostile work environment.37 Although charac-
terized as intentional discrimination, hostile work environment or
harassment claims are not analyzed pursuant to the McDonnell Doug-
las framework. To assert an actionable hostile work environment
claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the discrim-
inatory conduct is both subjectively and objectively sufficiently
“severe or pervasive ‘to . . . create an abusive working environ-
ment.’”38 Therefore, the plaintiff must not only perceive the work
environment as hostile or abusive, but the environment must also
be one that a “reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.”39
The plaintiff must also show that the harassing conduct was unwel-
come and because of a protected characteristic.40 Some lower
courts expressly require that plaintiffs demonstrate membership
within a protected category.41
35. Id.
36. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 256 (1981) (holding
that a plaintiff may succeed in an intentional discrimination case “either directly by persuad-
ing the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly
by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence”); Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147–48 (2000) (“Proof that the defendant’s
explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is
probative of intentional discrimination . . . [and] a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with
sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the
trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.”) (emphasis added).
37. See Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
38. See id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
39. See Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1991).
40. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
41. See, e.g., Harvil v. Westwood Comms., L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2005) (re-
quiring that a hostile work environment plaintiff demonstrate that she: (1) belongs to a
protected group; (2) was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) experienced harassment
because of a protected trait; and (4) was subjected to harassment that affected a term, condi-
tion, or privilege of employment).
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In companion cases, the Supreme Court also articulated the ways
in which an employer can defend hostile work environment claims
under Title VII.42 The employer’s available defenses and, thus, Title
VII liability, are conditioned upon the status of the employees creat-
ing the hostile work environment. In a situation in which a co-
worker is the culprit of harassing conduct on the basis of race,
color, national origin, religion, or sex, the employer may be held
liable under Title VII only if management knew or should have
known about the harassment yet failed to take reasonable measures
to correct it.43 An employer is automatically liable for a supervisor’s
harassment of a subordinate employee when the supervisor’s har-
assment results in a tangible employment action like a termination
or demotion.44 Yet, when a supervisor’s harassment does not result
in a tangible employment action, an employer is afforded an affirm-
ative defense to defeat Title VII liability.45 To take advantage of this
affirmative defense, the employer must present evidence that it “ex-
ercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any . . .
harassing behavior” and that the “plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportuni-
ties provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”46
At the outset, some courts are now rigidly applying the first
prong, known as the “membership prong,” of the aforementioned
legal frameworks to hold that misperception discrimination plain-
tiffs are not protected under Title VII. These courts reason that the
invidious, differential treatment the plaintiffs allegedly suffered was
not caused by their actual identity. Implicitly, these courts are char-
acterizing misperception discrimination plaintiffs as persons who
are not aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice under the
statute, even though they allege that they are the intended target of
discrimination on the basis of Title VII’s proscribed grounds.47
These courts have effectively concluded that such plaintiffs do not
have standing to initiate a Title VII claim and cannot benefit from
Title VII’s protection against workplace discrimination.48
Such an outcome is categorically wrong. It contravenes the reach
and purpose of Title VII’s proscriptions against religious, racial,
ethnic, color, and sex discrimination, and impairs one’s statutory
42. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
43. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799.
44. See Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. See infra Part III.D.
48. See infra Part V.
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right to be free from such workplace discrimination. Thus, the fol-
lowing sections critically appraise the development and negative
consequences of this misinterpretation of Title VII and proffer per-
suasive legal precedent and EEOC prescriptions for its cessation.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF AN ACTUALITY REQUIREMENT
IN TITLE VII CASES
Though in the making for nearly twenty years,49 the imposition
of an actuality requirement in Title VII intentional discrimination
cases is nascent. However, an actuality requirement has steadily
gained momentum in the federal judiciary within the past decade
in categorical discrimination cases involving misperceptions about
the plaintiff’s race, national origin, and religion.50 This Part details
the concurrent development of both an implicit and an explicit ac-
tuality requirement in misperception discrimination cases, as well
as more recent applications of this requirement in misperception
discrimination cases. In doing so, this Part determines that the im-
position of an actuality requirement by the federal judiciary is a
burgeoning trend in misperception discrimination cases, thereby il-
luminating a seismic shift from judicial pliability to judicial rigidity
in effectuating Title VII’s meaning and reach.
A. Implicit Adoption of an Actuality Requirement
A number of federal courts have imposed an actuality require-
ment in Title VII intentional race, national origin, and religious
discrimination cases.51 These courts have mandated this require-
ment primarily in cases of categorical discrimination that derive
49. See Perkins v. Lake Cnty. Dep’t of Util., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1262–63 (N.D. Ohio
1994) (defendant-employer arguing that the court should adopt an actuality requirement in
Title VII intentional discrimination cases based upon the notion that plaintiff did not prove
successfully that he was actually Native American; therefore, the plaintiff was unable to meet
a preliminary showing of protection against race and national origin discrimination under
Title VII, and thus the plaintiff could not assert an actionable discrimination claim).
50. See cases cited supra note 29; see also Leonard v. Katsinas, No. 05-1069, 2007 WL
1106136, at *9 (C.D. Ill. April 11, 2007) (holding in a conventionally framed race discrimina-
tion case under § 1981 that discrimination plaintiffs must satisfy an actuality requirement and
thereby prove their racial identity at trial).
51. See cases cited supra note 29.
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from an employer’s misperceptions about the plaintiff’s race, na-
tional origin, or religion.52 Misperception discrimination cases
expose a variety of categorical discrimination manifesting in con-
temporary American society53 and workplaces that is no different in
legal substance or injurious effect from the invidious, differential
treatment based upon a plaintiff’s self-ascribed identity alleged in
conventionally framed cases. Additionally, these discrimination
cases based on mistaken identity foreshadow the framing of dis-
crimination claims to come. With increased immigration, cultural
diversity, interracial marriages, and transracial adoptions, as well as
more formal recognition of mixed-race classifications and more
fluid conceptualizations of gender, racial, and cultural identity,54
courts will likely encounter more discrimination cases where an al-
leged dissonance exists between the employer’s categorization of an
employee and the employee’s self-identification.
Fundamentally, misperception discrimination claims are not ex-
ceptional. Discrimination plaintiffs claim to suffer invidious or
adverse treatment motivated by the discriminator’s conscious or un-
conscious perceptions about their race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin,55 which are informed by personal, temporal, and
broader social contexts. In conventionally framed discrimination
cases, the employer’s perception of the plaintiff’s identity simply
52. See cases cited supra note 29; see also Leonard, 2007 WL 1106136, at *9 (holding, in a
conventionally framed race discrimination case under § 1981, that discrimination plaintiffs
must satisfy an actuality requirement and prove their racial identity).
53. Misperceptions about an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
engender not only discrimination in the workplace but also violent hate crimes that are at
times fatal. See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 980 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. App. 1998) (upholding the
enhancement of the defendant’s criminal sentence for capital murder under the Texas Hate
Crimes Act where the defendant misperceived the minor victim as Black, and such mis-
perception motivated the defendant’s victimization of the child, which caused the child’s
death). Moreover, based upon media reports, an individual who opened fire on Sikhs in
their house of worship in Wisconsin, killing six and injuring numerous others, misperceived
the victims as Muslims. Though not yet confirmed, the assassin’s misperception quite plausi-
bly motivated his targeted act of violence. See Samuel G. Freedman, If the Sikh Temple Had Been
a Mosque, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/us/if-the-sikh-
temple-had-been-a-muslim-mosque-on-religion.html?_r=3.
54. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Legacy of Jim Crow: The Enduring Taboo of Black-White Ro-
mance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 739, 739–40 (2006) (positing that the increase in interracial
relationships and the growing acceptance of interracial intimacy, mixed-race identity, and
transracial adoption over the past half-century have drastically altered “notions about race
and races”; as a result, “racial mixture promises to transform the entire civil rights agenda in
the United States”). See generally Levit, supra note 9.
55. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548 (2011) (clarifying that
the “basic theory of [the class action plaintiffs in their Title VII intentional sex discrimination
case] is that a strong and uniform ‘corporate culture’ permits bias against women to infect,
perhaps subconsciously, the discretionary decisionmaking of each of Wal-Mart’s managers”).
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happens to comport with her self-perception.56 Conversely, in mis-
perception discrimination cases framed as instances of mistaken
identity, the employer’s perception of the plaintiff’s protected sta-
tus and the plaintiff’s self-ascribed identity are at odds. Both types
of discrimination cases reflect the socially constructed nature of
identity classification. External perceptions of one’s identity are oft-
entimes uncontroverted and, presumably, fixed and logical.57
Simultaneously, external perceptions of one’s identity are often-
times contestable, seemingly illogical, and formulated
independently of any awareness of an individual’s self-selected
identity.58
Nonetheless, an employer’s misperception of an individual’s pro-
tected status does not negate an employer’s related animus,
stereotyping, stigmatization, or the attendant malicious treatment.
Regrettably, a number of federal courts have ignored the fact that
such perceptions and the invidious, differential treatment activated
by them are at the crux of intentional discrimination. As a result,
these courts have adopted—both implicitly and explicitly—an un-
warranted actuality requirement in Title VII cases.
This Part first examines Afshar v. Pinkerton Academy,59 the first re-
ported case wherein a federal district court implicitly affirmed an
actuality requirement in Title VII. Thereafter, this Part analyzes two
central cases that expressly adopt an actuality requirement. The
first, Butler v. Potter,60 is the first reported Title VII misperception
discrimination case wherein a federal district court expressly
adopted an actuality requirement. The second, a more recent case,
Burrage v. FedEx Freight, Inc.,61 marks an intractable formation of the
actuality requirement in Title VII jurisprudence.
1. Afshar v. Pinkerton Academy
It is well-documented that after the tragic events of September
11, 2001, many Americans have become the victims of heightened
discrimination and violence, including murder, because of percep-
tions and misperceptions about their racial, ethnic, and religious
56. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
57. See infra Part III.D.
58. See infra note 233.
59. No. Civ. 03–137–JD, 2004 WL 1969873 (D.N.H. Sept. 7, 2004).
60. 345 F. Supp. 2d 844 (E.D. Tenn. 2004).
61. No. 4:10-CV-2755, 2012 WL 1068794 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012).
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identities.62 Namely, those who have been perceived or mis-
perceived as Muslim and/or of Middle Eastern descent have been
uniquely victimized as a result of the terrorist attacks on September
11th.63 Afshar v. Pinkerton Academy is representative of the invidious,
differential treatment occurring in American workplaces, which has
been coined “post-9/11 discrimination.”64 The plaintiff, Foad Af-
shar, a native Iranian, immigrated to the United States in 1977. In
1999, Afshar began working for the Academy as Director of the Gui-
dance Department. He experienced his fair share of problems his
first year on the job. Members of the Guidance Department issued
complaints against him and three guidance counselors resigned at
the end of the year. Despite the resignations and complaints, Afshar
received a favorable year-end evaluation, and the Academy renewed
his employment contract for a second year.65
Mr. Afshar’s second year evaluations improved and were positive.
Indeed, in the summer of 2001, Afshar was offered a promotion to
oversee two departments, which he declined. According to Afshar,
the 2001 school year began well, but shortly after the terrorist at-
tacks on September 11th he noticed a “distinct change” in the
manner in which his colleagues and the administration treated
him. Afshar claimed that he was excluded from the school’s re-
sponse to the September 11th tragedy. Soon after, the Assistant
Headmaster requested that Afshar present his green card, claiming
that it had expired even though it had not. Afshar also alleged that
one of the guidance counselors charged him with harassment and,
in doing so, accused him of “terrorizing” the department. Approxi-
mately six months later, the Academy decided not to renew Afshar’s
employment contract. Afshar sued his former employer, alleging
that “his contract was not renewed because of either his nationality
or his perceived religion in violation of Title VII.”66
62. See generally Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, the Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes
Eight Years After 9/11, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 33 (2009); Dawinder S. Sidhu, Out of Sight, Out of
Legal Recourse: Interpreting and Revising Title VII to Prohibit Workplace Segregation Based on Religion,
36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 103 (2012).
63. See generally Dawinder S. Sidhu, Violence against Sikhs Stems from Ignorance and Fear,
BALT. SUN (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-sikh-
shootings-20120806,0,6088052.story (contextualizing the recent killings of Sikhs at a temple
in Wisconsin on August 5, 2012 by explaining that “the Sikh community in America—for no
reason other than its members’ appearance—has suffered extensive harassment, prejudice
and violence in the years since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks”); Sidhu, supra note 62.
64. Sahar Aziz, From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim-American Women in the Crosshairs of
Intersectionality, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 191 (2012).
65. Afshar v. Pinkerton Academy, No. Civ. 03–137–JD, 2004 WL 1969873, at *1 (D.N.H.
Sept. 7, 2004).
66. Id. at *1.
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Afshar, like the vast majority of intentional discrimination plain-
tiffs, relied upon circumstantial evidence to prove his claims of
discrimination and satisfied the McDonnell Douglas analytical frame-
work in doing so. Afshar established a prima facie case of national
origin discrimination by demonstrating that he was a member of
a protected class, i.e., he was Iranian, he was qualified for the
guidance counselor position, the Academy terminated him by fail-
ing to renew his employment contract, and, allegedly, a woman of
non-Iranian descent less qualified than Afshar replaced him as Gui-
dance Counselor.67
After Afshar successfully established a prima facie case of na-
tional origin discrimination, the Academy asserted that its
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not renewing Afshar’s con-
tract was due to Afshar’s “ ‘issues’ with management skills, ‘issues’
dealing with parents, and problems with staff.”68 The defendant-em-
ployer satisfied its burden of production by supplying these reasons.
Mr. Afshar satisfied his ultimate burden of persuasion by undermin-
ing the credibility and neutrality of the alleged reasons for his
termination. According to the court, the Academy “offered new rea-
sons or at least expanded versions of those reasons to justify the
decision” throughout litigation upon Afshar’s challenge.69 Moreo-
ver, the court contextualized the Academy’s assertion that
remedying the alleged interpersonal strife between the staff and Af-
shar was one of its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not
renewing his contract.70 The court recognized that the friction be-
tween Mr. Afshar and his co-workers manifested shortly after
September 11th and was infused with ethnic bias against Afshar em-
anating from the tragic events.71 The court held that “to the extent
that [the Academy] argues that its decision to terminate Afshar was
necessary to resolve unrest in the Department, even if the unrest
was unfounded and due in part to discriminatory animus, that
would not be a legitimate basis for terminating him.”72
67. Id. at *4. The court specifically outlined that a plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie
case of discrimination by producing evidence of the following: “(1) he is a member of a
protected class; (2) he was qualified for the job; (3) the employer took an adverse employ-




70. See generally D. Wendy Greene, Pretext Without Context, 75 MO. L. REV. 403 (2010)
(positing that courts should place an employment discrimination plaintiff’s proffer of pre-
text—statements and behavior in the workplace—within historical and contemporary social
context as well as relational context in order to more meaningfully redress subtle race and
ethnic discrimination permeating contemporary workplaces).
71. See Afshar, 2004 WL 1969873, at *4.
72. Id.
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Although the court denied the Academy’s summary judgment
motion,73 its reasoning foreshadowed the creation of an actuality
requirement. The court did not expressly hold that misperception
discrimination cases are outside of Title VII’s jurisdiction, but it did
hold tightly to McDonnell Douglas’ protected class approach, which
essentially recognizes actionable discrimination as that which is
generated because of the plaintiff’s actual or self-ascribed identity.
First, the court held that Afshar satisfied a prima facie case of un-
lawful discrimination in part because he was actually Iranian and he
was replaced by a non-Iranian, i.e., someone outside of his pro-
tected class.74 Accordingly, the court merged Afshar’s religious
discrimination claim with his alternative claim of national origin
discrimination, reasoning that Afshar’s national origin claim and
misperception religious discrimination claims were “indistinguish-
able.”75 In a rare decision that granted a race and national origin
discrimination plaintiff his day in court,76 the Afshar court failed to
utilize an important opportunity to allow the plaintiff to accurately
frame his discrimination claim and to clarify that misperception dis-
crimination claims are cognizable under Title VII. Indeed, it is
quite probable that Mr. Afshar’s co-workers harassed him because
of his national origin, as knowledge of his Iranian nativity could
have engendered their misperception that he was Muslim. It is
equally plausible that, without any knowledge of his national origin,
Mr. Afshar’s co-workers misperceived him as Muslim. In other
words, Afshar’s national origin may have had no bearing on his co-
workers’ perception of him as Muslim. Nonetheless, by subsuming
Mr. Afshar’s national origin and religious discrimination claims and
employing a strict protected class approach in its analysis of his
prima facie case, the court essentially afforded Mr. Afshar Title VII
protection against invidious, differential treatment based upon his
actual national origin.77 Thus, the Afshar court implicitly affirmed
that Title VII proscribes discrimination on the basis of the plain-
tiff’s actual protected status.
73. Id. at *5.
74. Id. at *3.
75. Id. at *3 n.2.
76. See Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 889 (2006), for a study of race and national origin employment discrimination
cases in which Professor Parker concludes that “plaintiffs almost always lose when courts
resolve their claims.” Id. at 894. Parker contends that the main reason for such a low success
rate in national origin and race discrimination cases is an “anti-race plaintiff ideology” em-
braced by the judiciary, or a judicial attitude that race and national origin discrimination
plaintiffs’ claims “lack legal merit and the defendants are right as a matter of law.” Id. at 933.
77. See Afshar, 2004 WL 1969873, at *3 n.2.
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B. Express Adoption of an Actuality Requirement
1. Butler v. Potter
Only months after Afshar v. Pinkerton Academy, a federal district
court in the Eastern District of Tennessee expressly held that a
showing of actuality was required for Title VII protection against
categorical discrimination.78 In Butler v. Potter, a former carrier with
the U.S. Postal Service, Jesse Butler, who identified as a “white, Cau-
casian”79 male, alleged, among other claims, that his supervisor
harassed him on the basis of race or national origin in violation of
Title VII.80 According to Mr. Butler, his supervisor “accused” him of
being “Arab, Indian or Middle Eastern” because of his facial fea-
tures—namely, his “prominent nose”81—and harassed him
accordingly.82 With only a passing reference to Title VII’s substan-
tive provision, Section 703(a), the court endorsed the legal
argument of the U.S. government83 that “Title VII protects those
persons that belong to a protected class, and says nothing about
protection of persons who are perceived to belong to a protected
class.”84 In so holding, the court also summarily adopted the federal
government’s legal reasoning. The court declared that discrimina-
tion in Title VII cases would not be conceptualized by the court as a
78. In September 2004, the court issued its opinion in Afshar v. Pinkerton Academy. In
November 2004, the court issued its opinion in Butler v. Potter, 345 F. Supp. 2d 844 (E.D.
Tenn. 2004).
79. Butler, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 846.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 850. See generally D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair (and Other Race-Based
Characteristics) Got to Do With It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355, 1365–66 (illustrating that an
individual’s physical characteristics, like skin color, cranial structure, and the shape of one’s
nose or lips, have been racialized historically and contemporarily).
82. Butler, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 846.
83. In this case, attorneys with the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the U.S. Attor-
ney in Knoxville, Tennessee, represented the Postmaster General of the United States Postal
Service in his representative capacity. See id. at 846. Interestingly, governmental attorneys for
two federal agencies during the George W. Bush administration played a critical role in de-
veloping conflicting jurisprudence on the issue of whether a showing of actuality is required
for Title VII intentional discrimination cases involving misperceptions about the plaintiff’s
protected status. In 2004, in Butler v. Potter, the U.S. Department of Justice argued successfully
for the imposition of an actuality requirement in an intentional race/national origin discrim-
ination case under Title VII. In 2007, the EEOC argued successfully before the Fifth Circuit
in EEOC v. WC & M Enterprises that actuality is not required for Title VII protection against
intentional national origin discrimination emanating from an employer’s misperceptions
about the plaintiff’s ethnic identity. See infra Part V.A.
84. Butler, 345 F.Supp.2d at 850 (citation omitted). Defense counsel also supported its
argument for an actuality requirement (and thus disavowal of a perception theory in the
Title VII context) by referencing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which preceded the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act in proscribing disability discrimination. See id.
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phenomenon animated by employer perception: “Congress has
shown, through . . . the Americans with Disabilities Act, that it
knows how to enact legislation that protects persons who are
wrongly perceived to be in a protected class.”85 The court further
intimated that since neither Mr. Butler nor the federal government
proffered controlling legal precedent that expressly recognized a
perception theory of discrimination in the Title VII context, it was
obligated to hold that Butler’s misperception discrimination claim
was not actionable.86
Seemingly, the Butler court was amenable to foregoing a showing
of actuality had the litigants presented persuasive or controlling le-
gal authority to this effect.87 Nonetheless, since Butler, a number of
federal district courts have expressly adopted an actuality require-
ment in categorical discrimination cases involving allegations of
misperceptions about the plaintiff’s religion, race, or national ori-
gin, and one federal court of appeals has sanctioned this
prerequisite for statutory protection.88 In doing so, most courts
have simply rehashed the reasoning the Butler court advanced.89 For
example, in Lewis v. North General Hospital, a federal district court in
New York held that a plaintiff’s Title VII case failed as a matter of
law where an employer allegedly discriminated against the plaintiff
based upon his misperceived religious identity.90 Citing to Butler for
support, the Lewis court proclaimed that “protections of Title VII
do not extend to persons who are merely perceived to belong to a
protected class.”91
More recent misperception discrimination cases92 reveal a more
intractable disposition. Indeed, in the case discussed next, Burrage
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (noting that neither plaintiff nor defendant put forth controlling authority that
supported a holding that Title VII embraces a perception theory like the ADA and thus does
not require a showing of actuality in intentional discrimination cases).
88. See cases cited supra note 29.
89. See Adler v. Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 07-C-4203, 2008 WL 5272455, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2008); Lopez-Galvan v. Mens Warehouse, Civil No. 3:06-CV-537, 2008 WL
2705604, at *7 (W.D.N.C. July 10, 2008); McIntosh v. Ill. Dep’t. of Emp’t. Sec., No. 05-C-7044,
2007 WL 1958577, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 2007); Leonard v. Katsinas, No. 05-1069, 2007 WL
1106136, at *8 (C.D. Ill. April 11, 2007); Uddin v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., No. 1:05-CV-
1115-TWT, 2006 WL 1835291, at *6 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2006); EEOC v. WC & M Enter., Inc.,
No. Civ.A. H-04-3372, 2005 WL 2106090, at *4 (S.D. Tex. 2005) rev’d, 496 F.3d 393 (5th Cir.
2007).
90. 502 F. Supp. 2d 390, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. See, e.g., Burrage v. FedEx Freight, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-2755, 2012 WL 1068794 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 29, 2012); El v. Max Daetwyler Corp., No. 3:09-CV-415, 2011 WL 1769805, at *5–6
(W.D.N.C. May 9, 2011). A more detailed discussion of the El case is found infra Part III.B.
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v. FedEx Freight, Inc.,93 a federal district court in the Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio went to great lengths to ensconce an actuality
requirement for categorical discrimination plaintiffs.
2. Burrage v. FedEx Freight, Inc.
Born of an African-American father and a white mother,94 Na-
thaniel Burrage claimed that his supervisors and several co-workers
at FedEx harassed him because they misperceived him as Mexi-
can.95 According to Burrage, for approximately three years his
supervisor and co-workers referred to him as Mexican and “cheap
labor” in a “derogatory and pervasive manner” and directed the
Spanish terms “Andale, Andale” and “Arriba, Arriba” toward him.96
Burrage alleged that after informing his supervisor of his Black and
white parentage, Burrage’s supervisor retorted that he “looked
Mexican.”97 Burrage claimed that he attempted to explain that be-
ing called Mexican offended him because one of his ex-girlfriends
requested that he deny to her family that he was Black and pretend
to be Mexican.98 His supervisor laughed at his account and contin-
ued to call him Mexican.99
Burrage also alleged that, on one occasion, FedEx dockworkers
pointedly questioned him about the veracity of a dehumanizing
graffiti statement on a trailer that read, “Mexicans were ‘proof that
American Indians had sex with buffalos.’”100 Burrage also claimed
that one day after greeting one of his supervisors, the supervisor
replied, “I don’t talk to Mexicans.”101 According to Burrage, he
complained to supervisory level FedEx employees, including the
supervisor who allegedly called him “Mexican” on several occasions
and told Burrage that he did not speak to Mexicans, about the race-
based references aimed at him by both supervisors and co-work-
ers.102 In doing so, he confided that their conduct left him feeling
“degraded,” “embarrassed and [a]shamed,” and disinterested in
working.103
93. Burrage, 2012 WL 1068794.
94. Id. at *2 n.2.
95. Id. at *1–2.
96. Id. at *1–2, *4.
97. Id. at *1–2.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *2.
101. Id. at *3.
102. Id. at *2.
103. Id.
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Burrage filed a Title VII claim against FedEx, alleging that he
suffered harassment on the basis of his race and/or color.104 The
court granted FedEx’s summary judgment motion on several
grounds.105 First, like the Butler court, the Burrage court reasoned
that Burrage failed to satisfy a prima facie element of a Title VII
intentional race discrimination claim: actual membership within
the racial group of which the harassers perceived the plaintiff to be
a member.106 In other words, since Burrage was not actually Mexi-
can as his co-workers and supervisors allegedly perceived him to be,
he could not satisfy a prima face case of race discrimination. In-
deed, the court held that “Title VII protects only those who are
actually in a protected class, and not those who are perceived to be in
a protected class.”107 The court further pronounced that “[c]laims
based on perceived class membership are not legally viable under
Title VII, and the Court will not expand the reach of Title VII to
cover that which Congress chose not to protect.”108
According to the court, Burrage did not present an actionable
Title VII race discrimination claim because none of the “alleged
harassing events were based upon his race (African-American) or
had a racial character or purpose.”109 The Burrage court reasoned:
[a]t best, the references to Burrage as “the Mexican” and
“cheap labor,” and the use of the Spanish terms “andale” and
“ariba,” [sic] represent the very unfortunate employment of
offensive stereotypes of Hispanics, and can be said to arise out
of a misperception that Burrage was of Hispanic descent; or at
worst, they amount to incomprehensible name calling. They
cannot reasonably be considered to have referred to the fact
that Burrage’s race was African-American or that his skin color
was brown . . .110
104. Id. at *1. Burrage also filed a complaint pursuant to Ohio state law. Id.
105. See id. at *8–9 (holding that Burrage failed to demonstrate a basis for employer
liability because he did not satisfy an actuality requirement, he did not sufficiently notify the
employer of alleged racial harassment, and he failed to take advantage of the reporting pro-
cess outlined in the employer’s anti-harassment policy, of which he was aware).
106. Burrage did not satisfy the first element of a hostile work environment claim within
this jurisdiction. Per the court, an employee asserting that he suffered a hostile work environ-
ment on the basis of race or color in violation of Title VII must first establish that “he is a
member of a protected class.” Id. at *4.  (emphasis added).
107. Id. at *5. (emphasis added).
108. Id. at *8. (emphasis added).
109. Id. at *5. Notably, the court classified Burrage as African American rather than
mixed-race although Burrage self-identified as Black and mixed-race. Id. at *1, *6.
110. Id. at *6. (emphasis added). Logically, one may question whether courts will begin
deciphering which racially derogatory terms are associated with a particular racial group.
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Therefore, the court did not simply impose an actuality require-
ment on plaintiffs in order to receive statutory protection and
ensure that an employer’s invidious, differential treatment of the
plaintiff on Title VII’s proscribed bases would be deemed remedia-
ble. It cemented an artificial line between protection and non-
protection under Title VII by holding that the discrimination that
one suffers does not become actionable until the discriminatory
treatment corresponds with one’s actual protected status. Indeed,
the court expressly held that Burrage’s racial harassment claim
failed because “Burrage [did not] maintain that his supervisors and
co-workers began to use any terms that were . . . related to his status
as an African-American, upon learning of his true race.”111
By the court’s reasoning, only if Burrage were in fact Mexican or
began suffering derogatory comments or references related to his
self-ascribed and self-reported racial identity as biracial or Black
would the court recognize Burrage’s statutory right to be free from
racial harassment.112 Instead of being called “Mexican,” “cheap la-
bor,” and having “andale” and “arriba” directed at him in a
deprecating manner by supervisors and co-workers, Burrage would
have to put forth allegations that he was called pejorative terms al-
luding to his self-ascribed racial identity, like “zebra,”113
“Euronigger,”114 “half-breed,”115 “Buckwheat,”116 “nigger,”117 or
111. Id. at *8 n.8 (emphasis added).
112. Based upon Burrage’s self-identification.
113. See Madison v. IBP, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 730, 752 (S.D. Iowa 1999), for a race dis-
crimination suit brought under Title VII, § 1981, and a state antidiscrimination law in which
a white female plaintiff contended that she endured racial insults aimed at her marriage to a
Black man and their children, whom a co-worker called “zebras,” “monkeys” and “fucking
nigger babies.”
114. See, e.g., Moore v. Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 2d 641, 643 & n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(minor plaintiff who self-identified as “African American and Caucasian” asserting a denial of
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because a public school high school
teacher allegedly made several public, racially discriminatory comments related to plaintiff’s
biracial identity, which included calling him “Euronigger”).
115. See Wheaton v. North Oakland Medical Center, 130 F. App’x 773, 777 (6th Cir. 2005),
for a Title VII race discrimination case in which a white female plaintiff supported her hostile
work environment claim with testimony that co-workers made insulting comments about her
long-term relationship with a Black man, and that a co-worker called their daughter a “half
breed.”
116. See Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1266 (7th Cir. 1991), for a Title VII
race-based hostile work environment case in which a Black male plaintiff testified that his co-
workers nicknamed him “Buckwheat.”
117. See, e.g., id. at 1267 (Black male plaintiff testifying during the trial of his Title VII
race-based hostile work environment case that his co-worker called him “nigger” and “dumb
nigger”). As seen in Madison v. IBP, Inc., this pejorative term unfortunately has been used to
demean individuals racialized as non-white more generally, as when a co-worker of a race
discrimination plaintiff called the plaintiff’s children, who were of Black and white parent-
age, “niggers.” 149 F. Supp. 2d at 752.
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“monkey.”118 Alternatively, according to the court, Burrage could
only benefit from Title VII’s protection against a racially hostile
work environment once the employer uncovered his mixed-race
heritage and subjected him to dehumanizing graffiti in the work-
place that specifically targeted interracial Black-white relationships,
biracial children, and/or Blacks more generally, rather than the de-
humanizing graffiti about individuals of Mexican ancestry (who
may or may not be of African descent).119
The court displayed an equally myopic and intransigent adher-
ence to an actuality requirement in its analysis of Burrage’s color
discrimination claim. The court acknowledged the plausibility of
FedEx employees aiming “offensive stereotypes of Hispanics”120 at
Burrage because of their “misperception that Burrage was of His-
panic descent.”121 Remarkably, however, the court concluded that
his being called “Mexican” in a racially subordinating manner and
being subjected to offensive stereotypes about Hispanics could not
“reasonably be considered to have referred to the fact that . . . his
skin color was brown.”122
First, in failing to acknowledge the obvious nexus between Bur-
rage’s theories of race and color discrimination, the court held that
Burrage’s Title VII color discrimination claim was not actionable
because the alleged remarks of Burrage’s co-workers and supervi-
sors did not have a “color-related character or purpose.”123
According to the court’s reasoning, Burrage needed to proffer ex-
press statements of FedEx employees that his skin color rather than
his general physical appearance (which plausibly encompasses his
skin color) spawned the comments “andale,” “arriba,” “cheap la-
bor,” and “Mexican,” as well as his supervisor’s persisting belief that
Burrage “looked Mexican.” Moreover, although the court expressly
recognized the often indistinguishable nature of race and national
origin discrimination,124 it depicted Burrage’s Title VII case as one
118. See Madison, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 752 (race discrimination plaintiff contending that co-
worker called her biracial children “monkeys”).
119. But see Daniels, 937 F.2d at 1268 (Seventh Circuit affirming that a racial harassment
claim can be supported by racially offensive comments not aimed at a plaintiff’s or a co-
worker’s “actual” race in light of evidence proffered that plaintiff’s co-worker, Randy Heron,
was called “Reinaldo Gonzalez” because he “looked Mexican” and that “Reinaldo” was
scrawled on a wall in the workplace alongside references to the Ku Klux Klan).
120. Id. at *6.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id. at *5 (contrasting Burrage’s allegations with the aphorism “the blacker the
berry, the sweeter the juice” proffered in support of a Title VII color discrimination claim
that survived summary judgment).
124. See id. at *7 (acknowledging that discrimination on the basis of national origin or
race “certainly overlap”).
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“where issues of national origin and race are [not] so intertwined
that it is difficult to separate the two for purposes of analysis.”125
The court characterized Burrage’s hostile work environment case as
one of national origin discrimination, deeming it “a separate and
distinct form of discrimination” from race or color discrimina-
tion.126 In the court’s estimation, the alleged comments directed at
Burrage were unequivocally based upon national origin and not
upon race or color.127 Consequently, the court held that Burrage
could not “recast a national origin claim into one of race or
color.”128 The court criticized Burrage’s quite cogent argument that
“‘but for’ his skin color, he would not have been perceived as Mexi-
can or Hispanic,”129 as “circular logic.” Meanwhile, the court itself
engaged in flawed reasoning in order to circle back to and fortify its
initial decree: “Title VII protects only those who are actually in a
protected class.”130 The court would not recognize categorical dis-
crimination cases emanating from an employer’s misperceptions
about a plaintiff’s race, color, or national origin under Title VII
unless Congress commanded the court to do so.
In light of its express actuality requirement, it appears that the
court strategically framed Burrage’s race and color discrimination
claims as theoretically distinguishable from his claim of national or-
igin discrimination in order to effectively render Burrage’s hostile
work environment claim irremediable under Title VII. To present
an actionable Title VII claim of national origin discrimination, Bur-
rage would have to undermine his allegations and, once again,
satisfy a superfluous condition by demonstrating that he was actu-
ally of Mexican descent. What if Burrage or a like plaintiff
uncovered during the litigation of his employment discrimination
case that he descended from Mexican ancestors or discovered that
he was adopted and that his natural mother or father was of Mexi-
can descent?131 What if his supervisors also began aiming
125. Id.
126. See id. at *6 (“[C]omments supporting one type of discrimination can[not] provide
the sole support for a claim for a separate and distinct form of discrimination.”).
127. See id. at *7 (cursorily citing to federal court opinions in Title VII discrimination




130. Id. at *5. (emphasis added).
131. See, for example, Wood v. Freeman Decorating Services, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-00375-LRH-
RAM, 2010 WL 653764, at *4–5 (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 2010), for a Title VII intentional race/
national origin discrimination case in which the plaintiff maintained that he began to self-
identify as Native American after his adopted mother informed him that his biological
parents were Native American though his birth certificate classified him as white and he had
self-classified as white and as Hispanic at earlier points in his life. See also Defendant’s Motion
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derogatory comments at Burrage related to his Black or multi-racial
identity or making deprecating references about his skin color? Ac-
cording to the court’s holding and rationale, such ancestral
evidence and offensive comments could magically transform non-
cognizable claims of national origin, race, or color discrimination
into cognizable claims of discrimination under Title VII.
Such a line of demarcation between statutory protection and
non-protection is nonsensical and contrived. There is no plausible
reason for the court to protect Burrage against a racially hostile
work environment if the employer repeatedly called him a “half-
breed” or “Buckwheat” rather than shouting “andale” at him in a
demeaning way or calling him “cheap labor.” Likewise, there is no
reason for a court to extend Title VII protection to an employee
who self-identifies as Hispanic and whom an employer calls “cheap
labor” and directs “andale” or “arriba” in a derogatory manner but
to fail to extend statutory protection to Burrage who suffers the
same invidious treatment in the workplace.
III. TOWARDS UNITY: THE METHODS BEHIND
THE ACTUALITY MADNESS
Part II described the birth of the actuality requirement imposed
in Title VII intentional discrimination cases. This Part will continue
exploring the development of certain courts’ actuality requirement
and will also consider the myriad underlying justifications for their
inflexibility in Title VII misperception discrimination cases. This
Part argues that such courts’ interpretative methodology in cases of
categorical discrimination marks the arrival of a peculiar “anti-an-
ticlassificationist” interpretation of Title VII, an intransigent
statutory reading that negates express legislative objectives and con-
ventional understandings of the meaning and scope of
antidiscrimination law.
A. Nothing Borrowed: Courts’ Refusal to Apply the ADA’s Perception
Theory to the Title VII Context
Uniformly, without exploring Title VII’s purpose or meaning or
even referencing the EEOC’s express guidance on misperception
discrimination,132 a band of federal district courts and one federal
to Dismiss, Wood v. Freeman Decorating Servs., Inc., No. 3:08-CV-00375-LRH-RAM, 2009 WL
4836455 (D. Nev. July 30, 2009).
132. See infra Part V.A.
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appellate court have concluded that cases involving invidious, dif-
ferential treatment motivated by an employer’s misperceptions
about an employee’s race, religion, or national origin (and by ex-
tension, color or sex) are beyond Title VII’s scope.133 Moreover,
these courts did not acknowledge the fact that the alleged invidi-
ous, differential treatment the plaintiffs experienced is inherently
connected to the defendant-employer’s perceptions of the plain-
tiffs’ racial, ethnic, or religious identity or status.134 Notably, in
these intentional discrimination cases, the focal point for courts
when adopting an actuality requirement (and rejecting a percep-
tion theory of discrimination) is an antidiscrimination statute
Congress enacted nearly three decades after Title VII, the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA).135 The recurring, express
justification that courts proffer for imposing an actuality require-
ment is a facial difference among the substantive provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.136
In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act to
respond to the discrimination that disabled individuals experienced
in the American workplace, as well as the lack of access in places of
public accommodation.137 With the ADA, Congress expressly cov-
ered claims stemming from misperceptions about an individual.
The Act made it unlawful for employers to discriminate against in-
dividuals whom they “regard[ed] as” disabled even if the individuals
133. See, e.g., Burrage v. FedEx Freight, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-2755, 2012 WL 1068794, at *5–6
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012); El v. Max Daetwyler Corp., No. 3:09-CV-415, 2011 WL 1769805, at
*5–6 (W.D.N.C. May 9, 2011) aff’d, 451 Fed. App’x 257 (4th Cir. 2011); Adler v. Evanston Nw.
Healthcare Corp., No. 07-C-4203, 2008 WL 5272455, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2008); Lopez-
Galvan v. Mens Warehouse, Civil No. 3:06-CV-537, 2008 WL 2705604, at *7 (W.D.N.C. July 10,
2008); McIntosh v. Ill. Dep’t. of Emp’t. Sec., No. 05-C-7044, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 2007);
Uddin v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., CIVA1:05-CV-1115-TWT, 2006 WL 1835291, at *6
(N.D. Ga. June 30, 2006); EEOC v. WC & M Enter., Inc., No. Civ.A. H-04-3372, 2005 WL
2106090, at *4 (S.D. Tex. 2005) rev’d, 496 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2007).
134. See infra Parts III.A, C.
135. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)).
136. See Leonard v. Katsinas, No. 05-1069, 2007 WL 1106136, at *12 (C.D. Ill. April 11,
2007) (distinguishing the plain language of § 1981 and the ADA to hold that the plaintiffs
must prove their “actual” race at trial in order to maintain their § 1981 race discrimination
claim). Accordingly, the adoption of the actuality requirement is not limited to the Title VII
context and thus implicates the available federal protection against race discrimination and
quite plausibly broader state level protection under antidiscrimination statutes that mirror
the plain language of Title VII’s substantive provision.
137. Americans with Disabilities Act § 2, 104 Stat. at 328–29 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 12101).
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did not suffer an actual disability.138 In 2008, Congress further en-
acted the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) with the express
purpose of ensuring that courts construe “the definition of disabil-
ity . . . in favor of broad coverage of individuals . . . to the maximum
extent permitted.”139 Like the ADA, the ADAAA prohibits covered
employers140 from discriminating against an individual who has an
actual disability, a record of a disability, or who is regarded as hav-
ing a disability.141
As outlined in Part I, Title VII does not expressly include “re-
garded as” language in its substantive provision like the ADA.
Instead, Title VII prohibits covered employers from discriminating
against an individual “because of such individual’s race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin.”142 Accordingly, courts have reasoned
that, since the ADA expressly includes a “regarded as” or percep-
tion theory of discrimination in its substantive provision and Title
VII does not, discrimination claims based upon an employer’s mis-
perception about the plaintiff’s race, national origin, religion (and,
by extension, color and sex) are not cognizable under Title VII.
Yet, in their groundbreaking article, By Any Other Name?: On Being
“Regarded as” Black and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and
Jamal are White, Professors Angela Onwuachi-Willig and Mario
Barnes argue that if courts viewed the substantive provisions in the
ADA and Title VII as mutually reinforcing rather than distinct con-
cepts, a more precise and nuanced understanding of the operation
of discrimination would be revealed.143 At the heart of invidious,
differential treatment are perceptions or misperceptions that ob-
servable or ascertainable characteristics signify an individual’s
physical and mental capability, morality, and self-worth, among
other individual characteristics.144 Indeed, the Third Circuit ac-
knowledged the interdependency between perceptions and
138. Id. § 3, 104 Stat. at 329–30 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102).
139. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 2–4, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–56
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–02).
140. The ADA defines an “employer” as a “a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calen-
dar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person.”
Americans with Disabilities Act § 101, 104 Stat. at 330 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111).
141. ADA Amendments Act § 4, 122 Stat. at 3555 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
143. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being “Re-
garded as” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal are White, 2005 WIS. L.
REV. 1283, 1325–43.
144. According to Professor Robert Post:
[p]rejudice against a stigmatizing characteristic, such as race or sex, can manifest itself
through invidious judgments of the “differential worth” of persons who display the
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discrimination in its declaration that “[d]iscrimination stems from
a reliance on immaterial outward appearances that stereotype an
individual with imagined, usually undesirable, characteristics
thought to be common to members of the group that shares these
superficial traits.”145
Professors Onwuachi-Willig and Barnes also poignantly observe
that, notwithstanding the fact that Title VII does not expressly in-
clude “regarded as” language, “nothing . . . prevents a court from
using doctrinal analyses and understandings from other antidis-
crimination statutes to assist in understanding the operation of
discriminatory conduct within the Title VII context.”146 Nonethe-
less, when ascertaining the operation of discrimination in the Title
VII context, a number of federal courts have successively found
something preventing them from appropriating the ADA’s express
acknowledgement of discrimination as a perception based phenom-
enon. It appears that courts have manipulated a seemingly logical
comparative construal of the ADA’s and Title VII’s plain language
to substantiate the unqualified dismissal of discrimination cases.
Regrettably, courts have relied upon the mere presence of the
ADA’s “regarded as” language to deny protection to individuals
whose allegations unequivocally implicate protected characteristics
and their invidious use, despite the fact that Congress sought to
eliminate such considerations in employment decisions. Courts
have boldly declared that “Title VII protects those persons that be-
long to a protected class. . . . [since] Congress has shown, through
. . . the Americans with Disabilities Act, that it knows how to enact
legislation that protects persons who are wrongly perceived to be in
a protected class.”147 In doing so, courts have contrasted the sub-
stantive provisions of the ADA and Title VII in a way that does not
acknowledge that Title VII has “long-shared [sic] with the ADA an
identical congressional and judicial philosophy—namely, that em-
ployer perception or stereotype is an appropriate justification for
characteristic, or it can manifest itself through “faulty” judgments about the capacities
of such persons. American antidiscrimination law understands itself as negating such
prejudice by eliminating or carefully scrutinizing the use of stigmatizing characteris-
tics as a ground for judgment.
Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 9 (2000) (quoting Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1976), and GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NA-
TURE OF PREJUDICE 9 (1954)).
145. Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 1991).
146. Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 143, at 1328. (emphasis added).
147. Butler v. Potter, 345 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (E.D. Tenn 2004).
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imposing employment discrimination liability, even when that per-
ception or stereotype is erroneous and inaccurate.”148 Furthermore,
some courts have simply dismissed the fact that employers’ subjec-
tive perceptions, related animus, stigmatization, and stereotypes are
the impetuses for resulting invidious, differential treatment in all
cases, whether such categorical discrimination is on the grounds of
disability, race, national origin, sex, religion, or color.
B. Something Borrowed: A Rigid Application of the Protected Class
Approach in McDonnell Douglas
Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer to discrimi-
nate “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”149 Courts have routinely held that this substantive
statutory provision prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
color, sex, national origin, and religion.150 Nonetheless, as previ-
ously discussed, a number of federal courts have concluded that
this proscription affords statutory protection only to individuals
who are discriminated against on the basis of their actual race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.151
It is unlikely that the courts are simply engaging in a strict, literal
interpretation of Title VII’s plain language. Courts like the Butler
court have merely referenced Title VII’s substantive provision by
citation.152 Equally significant, courts make no mention of Con-
gress’s interpretive memoranda issued during the enactment of
Title VII or Congress’s more recent expression of Title VII’s pro-
scriptions.153 For example, an oft-cited bipartisan interpretive
memo, which Senators Clifford Case and Joseph Clark, the floor
managers of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, entered into the congres-
sional record, explains that “[t]o discriminate is to make a
distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor, and those
distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are prohib-
ited by section [703] are those which are based on any five of the
forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.”154
148. Craig Robert Senn, Perception Over Reality: Extending the ADA’s Concept of “Regarded As”
Protection under Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 827 (2009).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
150. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
151. See cases cited supra note 29.
152. See, e.g., Butler, 345 F. Supp. 2d 844.
153. See cases cited supra note 29.
154. 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (emphasis added).
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Moreover, as previously mentioned, in 1991 Congress amended
Title VII and, in doing so, clarified that an employer violates the
Act when a plaintiff “demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment prac-
tice.”155 A faithful construal of this more recent statutory
amendment and of congressional intent in enacting Section 703
would permit claims of invidious, differential treatment on the basis
of Title VII’s proscribed characteristics regardless of whether such
treatment derives from the plaintiff’s self-ascribed or mistaken iden-
tity.156 Nevertheless, no express deconstruction of Title VII’s
original and more recent statutory language or of Title VII’s pur-
pose and meaning emerges in the opinions of cases like Butler.157
Therefore, it does not appear that courts are attempting to employ
an exacting interpretation of Title VII’s plain language to conclude
that Title VII only protects individuals against discrimination be-
cause of their actual protected status and, thus, that misperception
discrimination plaintiffs are a class of individuals that Congress did
not intend to cover.
It does appear, however, that courts are engaging in a literal ap-
plication of the protected class approach first articulated in
McDonnell Douglas v. Green. McDonnell Douglas was a conventionally
framed Title VII intentional discrimination case in that the plaintiff
alleged that his former employer discriminated against him because
of his self-ascribed racial identity. The Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff established the first element of his prima facie case of ra-
cial discrimination because he demonstrated that he was a member
of a racial minority (i.e., because he was Black).158 Accordingly, a
plaintiff may satisfy an initial prima facie element by demonstrating
that she is a member of a protected class, which generally amounts
to a simple attestation by the plaintiff of her relevant identity. For
example, the plaintiff in a race discrimination case may allege that
she is white or, in a sex discrimination case, the plaintiff may allege
that she is a woman.159 Since Vinson v. Meritor Savings Bank,160
wherein the Supreme Court recognized a harassment theory of dis-
crimination under Title VII, some lower courts have closely
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
156. See infra Part V.
157. See cases cited supra note 29.
158. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
159. But see Part IV.B (demonstrating that courts’ actuality requirement will engender
identity litigation as an initial matter in conventionally framed intentional discrimination
cases as well as those deriving from misperceptions about the plaintiff’s identity).
160. 477 U.S. 57, 64–67 (1986).
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followed McDonnell Douglas and have also required Title VII harass-
ment plaintiffs to prove membership within a protected class.161
However, this rigid application of the McDonnell Douglas formula
is misplaced. The Supreme Court made clear that the elements of a
prima facie case were not meant to be applied in formulaic fashion.
In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, the court cautioned lower courts
against perfunctorily applying the framework developed therein to
assess Title VII intentional discrimination cases based upon circum-
stantial evidence. In doing so, the court explained that “facts
necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification . . . of
the prima facie proof required from [the plaintiff] is not necessarily
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.”162 In
Furnco Construction Corporation v. Waters, the Supreme Court reiter-
ated that the McDonnell Douglas test “was never intended to be rigid,
mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly
way to evaluate the evidence in light of the common experience as it
bears on the critical question of discrimination.”163
Consequently, McDonnell Douglas’s initial prima facie element—a
plaintiff demonstrates that she is a member of a protected class—
may simply be the manifestation of the facts of the case at hand.
The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas self-identified as Black and the
employer perceived him as such (or, at least, did not challenge the
plaintiff’s racial identity).164 It is also quite probable that when artic-
ulating this membership prong, the Supreme Court did not
contemplate that a Title VII discrimination plaintiff’s allegations of
invidious, differential treatment may not comport with her self-
ascribed identity. The Court may have conceptualized certain iden-
tities, like racial and gender identities, in static terms. The
development of a membership prong in McDonnell Douglas may
have also been a function of the lack of clarity at the time concern-
ing whether Title VII was solely meant to redress discrimination
against nonwhites, or if all individuals regardless of their racial clas-
sification would be protected against discrimination engaged in by
covered employers.165 Nevertheless, based upon the Court’s express
161. See, e.g., Burrage v. FedEx Freight, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-2755, 2012 WL 1068794, at *4
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012) (holding that a Title VII hostile work environment plaintiff must
first establish membership within a protected class); Harvil v. Westwood Comms., L.L.C., 433
F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2005) (requiring a hostile work environment plaintiff to demonstrate
that she “is a member of a protected group”).
162. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.3.
163. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (emphasis added).
164. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792.
165. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278–79 (1976) (clarifying
three years after McDonnell Douglas that the legislative history, EEOC statutory interpreta-
tions, and dicta in Griggs affirm that Title VII is “not limited to discrimination against
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directive that lower courts fluidly apply the elements it set forth in
McDonnell Douglas, it is illogical to conclude that the first prong of
the McDonnell Douglas framework must be construed as an absolute
bar against misperception discrimination claims.
Professor Natasha Martin acutely observes, however, that:
[d]iscrimination law confronts identity as if it were static, and
this approach has been shown to be inadequate in capturing
the complexity of identity and the perceptions of employees in
contemporary work settings. The protected-class approach
under Title VII has focused largely on the physical embodi-
ment of the identity category—the immutable aspects of an
individual’s identity.166
Courts’ unyielding devotion to the McDonnell Douglas’s membership
prong in cases of misperception discrimination reflects the critical-
ity to the protected class approach of identity as an immutable
quality. Thus, the convergence of the legal construction of immuta-
bility and the protected class approach is entrenched in
antidiscrimination law.167 As a consequence, courts have effortlessly
and rigidly applied this membership prong in misperception dis-
crimination cases. In doing so, courts have instituted an onerous
burden on plaintiffs, and set aside reason and established legal pre-
cedent in the process, as seen in a more recent Title VII
misperception discrimination case, El v. Max Daetwyler
Corporation.168
members of any particular race,” and thereby holding that Title VII prohibits racial discrimi-
nation against whites as well nonwhites).
166. Natasha T. Martin, Diversity and the Virtual Workplace: Performance Identity and Shifting
Boundaries of Workplace Engagement, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 605, 642 (2012).
167. See Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law,
52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1509 (2011) (arguing that “the concept of immutability has
been a fixture in both constitutional and statutory analysis of discrimination issues . . . [and]
is a unifying principle that satisfactorily explains the protected classifications [covered in
employment discrimination statutes]”). But see Jessica A. Clarke, Inferring Desire, 63 DUKE L.J.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 77–79), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2238252
(explaining that, in order for plaintiffs to benefit from protection against sexual orientation
discrimination under current and future state and local laws, there is a “temptation to re-
quire a plaintiff to prove she is a member of a protected class (i.e., lesbian, gay, bisexual, or
transgender) as a part of her prima facie case of discrimination” and cautioning against ap-
plying a protected class/immutability approach that results in the adjudication of one’s
sexual orientation because “courts rely on narrow, self-identification and reputation based
definitions [of sexual orientation], which distract from the purpose of remedying discrimina-
tion and require a plaintiff who desires the law’s protection to ‘out’ herself,” and fail to
acknowledge the fluidity and multidimensionality of sexual orientation).
168. El v. Max Daetwyler Corp., No. 3:09-CV-415, 2011 WL 1769805, (W.D.N.C. May 9,
2011) aff’d, 451 Fed. App’x 257 (4th Cir. 2011).
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In El v. Max Daetwyler Corporation, a pro se plaintiff, Darryl El,
alleged that he was terminated from his employment in violation of
Title VII based upon his race, color, and religion.169 He specifically
claimed that he experienced invidious, differential treatment based
upon his “perceived race, Negroid,”170 and his religion.171 In his
complaint, El stated that he was in fact a Universalist and later testi-
fied at a motion hearing that “he had no religion.”172 Nonetheless,
Mr. El alleged that, after the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, co-workers and a supervisor began treating Muslim employees
“with suspicion” and began treating him differently because they
misperceived him as Muslim.173 He specifically contended that sev-
eral coworkers threatened him a day after the terrorist attacks, a few
co-workers and a supervisor asked him to declare his religious iden-
tity, and, at an undesignated time, a few of his co-workers and a
supervisor requested that he “remove [his] religious pictures.”174
Like the Burrage court, the El court held that the plaintiff’s claims
of intentional race and religious discrimination were beyond Title
VII’s jurisdiction and dismissed his case.175 The Fourth Circuit sum-
marily affirmed the dismissal of El’s discrimination case.176
Specifically, the district court held that El’s Title VII religious dis-
crimination claim failed as a matter of law, since his allegations of
invidious, differential treatment in the workplace were not based
upon his actual religion or his being a Universalist177 but upon
169. Id. at *1.
170. Id. at *5.
171. Id. at *6.
172. Id. at *5.
173. Id.
174. Id. at *4.
175. Id. at *5–7. On a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the El court dismissed the plaintiff’s Title VII claims of intentional discrimination
based upon misperceptions about his religion, race, and color, employing the Supreme
Court’s heightened “plausibility” pleading standard for civil litigants adopted in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), on employ-
ment discrimination cases. See El, 2011 WL 1769805, at *2–3. For a more detailed
examination of the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard’s impact on the early dismissal of em-
ployment discrimination cases, see generally Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing Civil Procedural
Hurdles in the Quest for Justice, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 621 (2011). See also Victor D. Quintanilla,
Beyond Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination,
17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2011) (illustrating the increased dismissals of race discrimination
claims initiated by Black plaintiffs after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Iqbal and Twombly).
176. 451 Fed. App’x. 257 (4th Cir. 2011).
177. Arguably, El’s allegations of religious discrimination were not based upon his athe-
ism, as courts have established that Title VII protects atheists against religious discrimination.
See, e.g., Reed v. Great Lakes Cos. Inc., 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003) (asserting that “an
atheist . . . cannot be fired because his employer dislikes atheists” and thereby concluding an
employer’s discrimination on the basis of atheism violates Title VII).
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misperceptions about his being Muslim.178 With respect to El’s re-
ligious discrimination claim, the court circuitously declared that “El
cannot be a member of a protected class absent some membership
in a protected class.”179 Notably, in an act of dogged adherence to a
formalistic version of the protected class approach, the El court di-
rectly contravened established precedent in its declaration that
religious discrimination plaintiffs are only protected if they are
members of a religious group.180 It has long been recognized that
atheists, too, are protected under Title VII.181 Therefore, an individ-
ual need not be a member of a religious group to benefit from Title
VII’s protection against religious discrimination.182
Just as the posture of the court in El represented a break with the
traditional recognition of antidiscrimination protections for athe-
ists, the posture of courts in more recent employment
discrimination cases like El and Burrage also reflects a dramatic shift
in judicial attitude. Courts have moved from flexibility to rigidity in
just fifty years since Title VII’s enactment. Six years after Congress
enacted Title VII, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared that it
is “the duty of the courts [in Title VII cases] to make sure that [Title
VII] works, and the intent of Congress is not hampered by a combi-
nation of a strict construction of the statute and a battle with
semantics.”183 Here, courts’ ultimate denial of protection in previ-
ously mentioned misperception discrimination cases in no way
constitutes an embrace of this judicial charge to interpret broadly
Title VII in furtherance of the statute’s goals and meaning so that
Title VII “works.”
Though not without flaws, broad judicial interpretation of Title
VII’s proscriptions has been pivotal in the diminishment of exclu-
sionary and subordinating employment practices on the basis of
race, color, sex, national origin, and religion. Importantly, courts
have interpreted Title VII expansively to reach invidious, differen-
tial treatment in the workplace that Congress did not initially
envision when enacting Title VII but which squarely fits within Title
178. El, 2011 WL 1769805, at *6.
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. See Young v. Sw. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975) (affirming that Title
VII protects atheists from religious discrimination).
182. See id.; Reed, 330 F.3d at 934.
183. Culpepper v. Reynolds, 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970).
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VII’s province, such as hostile work environment184 or same-sex har-
assment claims.185 Indeed, in its recognition of same-sex harassment
as an actionable Title VII claim in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Ser-
vices, the Supreme Court explicated that “statutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable
evils.”186 Consequently, broad purposive interpretation of Title VII
on the part of courts, including this nation’s highest court, has
helped to solidify a normative ideal of inclusion and equal treat-
ment in the American workplace.
Yet, nearly fifty years after Title VII’s enactment, a “battle with
semantics” in which some federal courts have engaged has insti-
gated the imposition of an actuality requirement in cases involving
the principle evil for which Congress aimed to provide protection
and relief: invidious, differential treatment on the basis of race,
color, sex, national origin, and religion. Courts’ excessively narrow
interpretation of Title VII in categorical discrimination cases signi-
fies a notable shift in judicial perspective with respect to Title VII’s
reach in protecting individuals against workplace discrimination on
the basis of the statute’s enumerated grounds. Indeed, the denial of
Title VII protection to plaintiffs alleging invidious, differential
treatment on the basis of Title VII’s proscribed characteristics via a
seemingly literal application of Title VII’s plain language and an
express, exacting appropriation of the protected class approach
marks the arrival of a new yet erroneous interpretative methodol-
ogy that will elicit countless negative consequences if not ceased.187
C. Something New?: An “Anti-Anticlassificationist Interpretation”
of Title VII
By creating an artificial, unresolved tension between the “re-
garded as” language in the ADA and the “such individual” language
in Title VII and strictly adhering to a protected class approach,
courts deny purposive effect to Title VII’s proscription against in-
vidious, differential treatment in the workplace.188 This
184. See Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–67 (1986) (holding that sexual
harassment violated Title VII’s proscriptions against sex discrimination as such treatment
affected a “term, condition, and privilege” of employment).
185. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (holding that
same-sex harassment claims are covered under Title VII).
186. Id. at 79.
187. See infra Part IV and note 265.
188. But see Culpepper, 421 F.2d at 891 n.3. During a speech made to lawyers shortly after
Title VII’s enactment, the Honorable Griffin B. Bell of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
implored that the judiciary’s approach in interpreting and enforcing Title VII be “generous”
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interpretative dissonance prods Congress to amend Title VII, yet
engenders destructive implications that impede Title VII’s meaning
and scope in the meantime. Courts’ inflexible posture in defining
Title VII’s reach in combating workplace discrimination marks the
arrival of a new interpretative perspective within antidiscrimination
jurisprudence, which this Article describes as “anti-
anticlassificationist.”
It is important to note that courts’ interpretative methodology
largely shapes the scope of antidiscrimination law’s prohibitions
and protections. Professor Jessica Roberts aptly explicates that:
the antidiscrimination principle is often described in terms of
two sometimes competing, sometimes complementary, inter-
pretations: antisubordination and anticlassification. These two
versions of the antidiscrimination principle employ differing
accounts of the meaning of equality. The antisubordination
principle roughly holds that covered entities should not act in
a way that reinforces the social status of subjugated groups . . .
Its complement, the anticlassification principle, maintains that
covered entities should not consider certain classes of forbid-
den traits under any circumstance, adopting a formal equal
treatment model of equality.189
In The Anticlassification Turn,190 Professor Bradley Areheart ex-
plains that, at least facially, Title VII’s substantive disparate
treatment provision is “anticlassificationist” in nature.191 Areheart
submits that the Supreme Court evidenced its early antisubordina-
tionist commitments by interpreting Title VII to embody a disparate
impact theory of discrimination in Griggs v. Duke Power Company.192
Areheart argues, however, that the Supreme Court’s recent deci-
sion in Ricci v. DeStefano,193 a Title VII race discrimination case,
solidifies the Supreme Court’s shift from an antisubordinationist in-
terpretation of Title VII to an anticlassificationist approach, which
“shields individuals from all forms of disparate treatment based
in order to “make [Title VII] work.” Id. Judge Bell also proclaimed “[w]e want to fill in these
gaps, and we want to stay within the intent of Congress in making it work.” Id.
189. Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an Antidiscrimina-
tion Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 626–29 (2011).
190. Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination Law, 63
ALA. L. REV. 955 (2012).
191. Id. at 969.
192. See id. at 993; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (adopting a dispa-
rate impact theory of discrimination in Title VII cases to redress “not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation”).
193. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
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upon a forbidden trait” in furtherance of a norm of individual
fairness.194
Assuming that the prevailing posture of the Supreme Court (and
other members of the federal judiciary) is to interpret Title VII
through an anticlassificationist lens, it is notable that a number of
federal judges have rejected this perspective in Title VII mispercep-
tion discrimination cases. Through an express, strict application of
the protected class approach and an implicit, literal interpretation
of Title VII’s statutory language, a divergent anti-anticlassificationist
interpretation of Title VII emerges. Such an anti-anticlassificationist
methodology is marked by a paucity of meaningful statutory inter-
pretation, which effectively frustrates the orthodox aim of the
elimination of Title VII’s proscribed traits in all decision making in
furtherance of a norm of individual fairness. Indeed, no delibera-
tion of Title VII’s arguable goal of prohibiting any consideration of
race, religion, sex, color, or national origin from employment deci-
sion making surfaces in the court opinions which decree an
actuality mandate.195
Similarly, courts have not expressly acknowledged that underly-
ing misperception discrimination plaintiffs’ allegations is an
employer’s targeted unfair treatment on the basis of Title VII’s pro-
scribed characteristics. Also notably lacking is an acknowledgement
that Title VII should be interpreted in a manner effectuating fair
and equal treatment rather than maintaining invidious, differential
treatment in the workplace. Moreover, courts in previously men-
tioned misperception discrimination cases do not expressly
consider the potential negative consequences, both practical and
policy oriented, that an anti-anticlassificationist statutory interpreta-
tion will produce.
Courts’ anti-anticlassificationist interpretation and attendant ac-
tuality requirement fail to acknowledge the interrelated operation
of human categorization based upon conscious and unconscious
perceptions and resulting invidious (or even favorable), differential
treatment. Based upon one’s discernible characteristics, like skin
color, hair texture, behavior, dress, accent, speech, language, and
names,196 everyone is perceived by an observer at any given moment
as a particular race, color, ethnicity, or gender.197 In Performing Ra-
cial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title
194. See Areheart, supra note 190, at 963, 993–95.
195. See cases cited supra note 29.
196. See, e.g., El-Hakem v. BJY Inc., 415 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing that an
individual’s non-physical traits like a name could serve as a proxy for race or ethnicity).
197. See generally Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by
Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134 (2004).
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VII, Professor Camille Gear Rich describes “[t]he cognitive process
that people rely on to ascertain the race or ethnicity of another
person . . . as racial or ethnic ascription.”198 Professor Gear Rich
explains that:
[r]acial/ethnic ascription works by triggering racial or ethnic
associations when one sees another person display certain
traits. The most common form of racial and ethnic ascription
is morphology-based ascription. This kind of ascription occurs
when a subject interprets another person’s visible, physical fea-
tures to correlate with a set of features she identifies with a
certain race or ethnic group. These features include skin
color, hair texture, and nose or eye shape. The subject learns
to correlate these traits with one of three or four racial catego-
ries and, in some cases, an ethnic subgroup. Stated
alternatively, morphology-based racial/ethnic ascription oper-
ates by those “common sense” cognitive rules that cause a
person to conclude automatically that chocolate skin tones sig-
nify that a person is African, that olive skin tones indicate
Latin origin, that certain eye shapes are Asian or Caucasian, or
that particular nose structures are Caucasian or African. This
cognitive process is such a well-entrenched part of social inter-
action that it typically functions unnoticed. This is evidenced
by the fact that most Americans believe that they can, upon
review of a person’s physical traits, easily identify the person’s
race or ethnicity.199
Professor Gear Rich further elucidates that:
the same way that people develop a lexicon of morphological
traits that they use to identify a person’s race or ethnicity, they
also develop a taxonomy of voluntary behaviors that signify
race and ethnicity. That is, in the same way that we associate
skin color, eye color, or nose shape with particular races or
ethnic groups, we also maintain beliefs about the dialects, aes-
thetics, and mannerisms that signal one’s race or ethnic
status.200
Accordingly, in the manner that one’s morphological characteris-
tics signify race to the external observer, the racialization process
198. Id. at 1145.
199. Id. at 1145–46 (citations omitted).
200. Id. at 1158.
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encompasses “performance-based ascription” or the external cate-
gorization of one’s race in light of “ ‘voluntary’ race/ethnicity-
associated behavior.”201
Based upon his empirical study of sighted and blind peoples’
conceptualizations of race, Professor Osagie Obasogie likewise con-
cludes that the majority of blind respondents, similarly to sighted
respondents, correlated race primarily with physical traits like skin
color.202 According to Professor Obasogie, generally “both blind
and sighted people understand race in visual terms, suggesting that
there is a significant shared social experience that not only gives
race its meaning but makes it perceptible in the first place.”203 More
than half of the blind respondents participating in Professor
Obasogie’s study also reported that audible characteristics such as
an individual’s accent, tone of voice, and speech pattern served as a
secondary set of characteristics appropriated to categorize one’s
race.204 However, Professor Obasogie surmises that:
these audible clues did not stand in for the visual cues a
sighted person might rely upon, nor did they become primary
in how blind respondents conceived race. Rather, voice and
accent remained secondary measures used to give a sense of
what is thought to be the primary characteristic of race: visual
cues.205
In addition to audible characteristics, for a number of the blind
respondents, an individual’s skin texture, hair texture, and bodily
aroma were also significant factors in the respondents’ categoriza-
tion of an individual’s race.206
201. Id. at 1143.
202. Osagie K. Obasogie, Do Blind People See Race? Social, Legal, and Theoretical Considera-
tions, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 585, 595–96 (2010).
203. Id. at 597.
204. Id. at 599.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 600–01.
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Accordingly, despite omnipresent attestations of colorblind-
ness,207 gender-blindness,208 and post-racialism,209 it is essentially
impossible for any one person to escape being perceived and, thus,
categorized by an observer through the lens of race, ethnicity, relig-
ion, color, and gender, which are proscribed characteristics in
employment decision making under Title VII. According to Profes-
sor Linda Hamilton Krieger:
people categorize objects in their environment in a particular
way because it proves useful in understanding their environ-
ment and predicting future events. It would be difficult to
argue credibly that racial, ethnic, or gender distinctions have
no utility in understanding American society or negotiating ex-
perience within it. . . . [Therefore] [a]s a theoretical matter,
the notion that racial, ethnic, or gender distinctions could be
ignored in the priming of schematic expectancies is, at best,
implausible. As an empirical matter, it is simply insupportable.
207. Professor John Powell argues that a “colorblind, race-neutral position currently oc-
cupies center stage in the American debate on race, both in politics and in the law.” John A.
Powell, An Agenda For the Post-Civil Rights Era, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 889, 893 (1995); see also
Athena D. Mutua, Introducing ClassCrits: From Class Blindness to a Critical Legal Analysis of Eco-
nomic Inequality, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 859, 876 (2008) (arguing that the colorblind rhetoric
“ignores, cements, and blinds itself to the historical factors that determine, shape and con-
tinue to structure the racial caste system that law and society constructed in the first place”).
208. According to Professor Lucinda Finley:
[t]he insistence that the law should be blind to stereotyped, not “real,” differences of
gender, just as it should be color-blind, is often prescribed as the proper antidote to
. . . “girls and boys each have their proper place” separate spheres thinking [funda-
mental to the Supreme Court’s decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, which affirmed the
constitutionality of the separate-but-equal doctrine].
Lucinda M. Finley, Sex-Blind, Separate But Equal, or Anti-Subordination? The Uneasy Legacy of
Plessy v. Ferguson for Sex and Gender Discrimination, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1108 (1996)
(citing J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1422 (1994)).
209. In 2008, a sea of media pundits, politicians, and average Americans proclaimed that
the election of President Barack Obama demarcated a post-racial moment in United States
history. See generally Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Narratives of Identity, Nation, and Out-
siders Within Outsiders: Not Yet a Post-Anything World, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 325, 325–36
(2011) (acknowledging that “[t]he present conceptualization of a post-racial America be-
came mainstream for many when Barack Obama took office as the 44th President of the
United States in 2008” and noting that, immediately following his election, “all of the major
news outlets began debating whether his victory brought an official end to the acknowledged
pernicious and longstanding racial and ethnic stigmas that have pervaded this country”).
Professor Sumi Cho maintains that “post-racialism is yet distinct as a descriptive matter [from
colorblindness], in that it signals a racially transcendent event that authorizes the retreat
from race. Colorblindness, in comparison, offers a largely normative claim for a retreat from
race that is aspirational in nature.” Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1597–98
(2009).
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Because gender, ethnic, and racial distinctions are often per-
ceptually apparent, and because these categories are made
salient by our social and cultural context, we can expect race,
ethnic, and gender-based schemas to be implicated in the
processing of information about other people. Once activated,
the content of a schema will profoundly affect how we inter-
pret a person’s subsequent behavior, what about that behavior
we remember, and how we use the behavior in judging the
person later.210
Such external observations and attendant categorizations are be-
yond an individual’s control, and are typically irrelevant to one’s
ability to perform her job duties, but serve as the central basis for
pervasive, systematic, and purposeful exclusion of individuals from
(and marginalization within) employment opportunities in the
American workforce. For that reason, Congress deemed it necessary
to proscribe invidious, differential treatment on certain bases with
the enactment of Title VII.211 Consequently, Title VII protects every-
one who is an employee of or seeks employment with a covered
entity against race, color, sex, national origin, and religious discrim-
ination. Any individual who suffers invidious, differential treatment
at the hands of a covered employer is therefore able to seek relief
under Title VII.
Judges’ anti-anticlassificationist interpretation of Title VII, which
expressly denies statutory protection to certain individuals alleging
that they are the victims of invidious, differential treatment on the
basis of proscribed characteristics, is categorically wrong. Such judi-
cial interpretation contravenes the express purposes of Title VII: to
afford “statutory rights against invidious discrimination in employ-
ment”212 and to eliminate such treatment from the workplace.213
Indeed, rather than dismantle categorical, inequitable treatment
210. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1201–02 (1995).
211. See Perkins v. Lake Cnty. Dep’t. of Util., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1276 (N.D. Ohio 1994)
(explicating that a Title VII plaintiff need not prove her racial identity in order to assert an
actionable claim of race or national origin discrimination in light of Title VII’s express pur-
pose: to “address [invidious treatment based upon] perceived differences which do not have
a basis in fact between races and ethnic groups”).
212. Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 457–58 (1975).
213. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (acknowledg-
ing that Title VII and the ADEA share a mutual purpose of “elimination of discrimination in
the workplace”) (quoting Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979)).
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against an individual on the basis of race, sex, color, national ori-
gin, and religion, courts’ misinterpretation of Title VII allows
unchecked invidious, differential treatment in the workplace.214
D. Something Old, Something New?: What Lies Beneath
the Actuality Requirement
The mere presence of the ADA’s “regarded as” language has ena-
bled courts to perpetuate such invidious, differential treatment by
embracing the argument that Title VII, unlike the ADA, only pro-
hibits discrimination based upon an individual’s actual protected
status. However, such a facial difference between the two statutes
does not adequately explain the dearth of thoughtful deconstruc-
tion by the courts regarding Title VII’s substantive provision,
purpose. Courts’ distinction between the substantive provisions in
Title VII and the ADA—in addition to an unyielding, literal applica-
tion of the protected class approach, which casts aside reason and
legal precedent and translates into an unorthodox, anti-anticlassifi-
cationist interpretation of Title VII’s proscriptions—causes one to
pause. On its face, the imposition of an actuality requirement in
cases of categorical discrimination is perplexing and problematic.
Understandably, questions abound relating to the development of
and rationale for the adoption of this puzzling legal prerequisite in
cases of invidious, differential treatment.
The previously examined cases offer little to draw upon to defini-
tively deduce courts’ justifications for employing an anti-
anticlassificationist interpretation of Title VII. Therefore, this Part
contemplates more obscure and more obvious explanations, new
and old, for this categorically wrong movement in antidiscrimina-
tion law. Namely, this Part observes the ways in which the actuality
requirement reflects lawmakers’ understandings of identity classifi-
cation, the operation of discrimination, and antidiscrimination
litigation. It also considers courts’ divergent treatment of the ADA’s
and Title VII’s statutory language and purpose as well as courts’
rigid application of antidiscrimination law’s protected class
approach.
Perkins v. Lake County Department of Utilities, the first reported Title
VII case in which an employer argued for the imposition of an actu-
ality requirement before a federal district court, was a case of
intentional race/national origin discrimination.215 Ten years after
214. See infra Part IV.A.
215. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. 1262.
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Perkins, Butler v. Potter—the first reported Title VII case in which a
federal district court expressly adopted an actuality requirement—
was also an intentional race/national origin discrimination case.216
Therefore, one simple observation may explain the derivation of an
actuality requirement: this mandate reflects an age-old conceptual-
ization of racial identity as biological, fixed, and inherent, as well as
courts’ longstanding treatment of “race and ethnicity as biological,
morphological concepts and discrimination as a reaction to a set of
biologically fixed traits.”217
Since the founding of the United States, securing race as a static,
predictable, and biological trait has functioned as a principal and
shared aspiration (and arguably fascination) among academic, so-
cial, political, and legal communities alike.218 Conceptualizations of
permanent, inheritable race, racial hierarchies, racial purity and ra-
cial superiority were espoused to justify and effectuate racial
oppression and exclusion in a plethora of manifestations including
racial colonization,219 racial slavery,220 racial segregation,221 and ra-
cial violence,222 as well as exclusionary race-based immigration
216. 345 F. Supp. 2d 844 (E.D. Tenn. 2004).
217. Rich, supra note 197, at 1134.
218. See generally Christian B. Sundquist, The Meaning of Race in the DNA Era: Science, History
and the Law, 27 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 231 (2008).
219. D. Wendy Greene, On Race, Nationhood, and Citizenship, 34 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 421,
425 (2009) (reviewing LAURA E. GÓMEZ, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN
AMERICAN RACE (N.Y. Univ. Press 2007)) (“Grounded in notions of white racial superiority,
Euro-American politicians and military leaders espoused ‘Manifest Destiny’ as the rationale
for, and the method by which, to expand United States borders westward [to colonize Mex-
ico] and abroad and create a Euro-American dynasty consisting of predominantly Euro-
Americans.”).
220. See D. Wendy Greene, Determining the (In)Determinable: Race in Brazil and the United
States, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 143, 164 (2009) (“[W]hite slave owners, philosophers, and politi-
cians, like Thomas Jefferson, articulated formal defenses of slavery in concert with the
country’s philosophical origins [which espoused liberty, equality and natural rights of men],
yet grounded in the presumption of whites’ natural superiority and Blacks’ innate
inferiority.”).
221. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954) (holding state-sanc-
tioned racially segregated public schools unconstitutional).
222. Throughout American history, notions of white supremacy and white racial purity
permeated the social fabric and fueled the lynching of racial minorities—largely men racial-
ized as non-white because of their ethnicity, color, race, or religion—when they transgressed
(or were perceived to transgress) socially and legally constructed racial boundaries, which
served as a form of extra-legal criminal enforcement. See generally Barbara Holden-Smith,
Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 31, 31–39 (1996).
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policies223 and property ownership qualifications.224 According to
Professor Christian Sundquist:
[t]he meaning of “race” has been vigorously contested
throughout history. Early theories of race assigned social, intel-
lectual, moral and physical values to perceived physical
differences among groups of people. The perception that race
should be defined in terms of genetic and biological differ-
ence fuelled the “race science” of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, during which time geneticists, physi-
ognomists, eugenicists, anthropologists and others purported
to find scientific justification for denying equal treatment to
non-white persons.225
As Professor Sundquist explains, post-World War II academic, le-
gal, and scientific communities have consistently repudiated
scientific notions of race and, conversely, have embraced a concep-
tualization of race as a social construct.226 For example, legal
scholar Ian Haney-López explains that:
[t]here are no genetic characteristics possessed by all Blacks
but not by non-Blacks; similarly, there is no gene or cluster of
genes common to all Whites but not to non-Whites. One’s race
is not determined by a single gene or gene cluster, as is, for
example, sickle cell anemia. Nor are races marked by impor-
tant differences in gene frequencies, the rates of appearance
of certain gene types.227
223. In 1790 and 1870, Congress enacted express race-based prerequisites for naturalized
United States citizenship. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (permitting only free
whites to become naturalized U.S. citizens); Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254,
256 (repealed 1952) (extending naturalized U.S. citizenship to individuals of “African
nativity”).
224. See, e.g., Rose Cuison Villazor, Blood Quantum Land Laws and the Race Versus Political
Identity Dilemma, 96 CAL. L. REV. 801, 808–09 (2008) (describing the U.S. government’s early-
twentieth-century adherence to blood quantum laws, which dictated that individuals with less
than “one-half American Indian blood” or ancestry could not own property after the enact-
ment of the Dawes Severalty Act, which divided indigenous-owned land as well as
commanded that “[m]ixed-blood” American Indians could only sell their property to “full-
blood” American Indians with the permission of the federal government).
225. Christian B. Sundquist, Science Fictions and Racial Fables: Navigating the Final Frontier of
Genetic Interpretation, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 57, 57 (2009).
226. See Sundquist, supra note 218, at 252–56 (illustrating that post-World War II, the
United Nations established the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UNESCO,
to develop a formal statement on race to “scientifically debunk the biological conception of
race” and drew upon leaders within the scientific community in doing so).
227. Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 11 (1994).
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Professor Haney-López thereby defines “race” as “a vast group of
people loosely bound together by historically contingent, socially
significant elements of their morphology and/or ancestry” and ar-
gues that:
race must be understood as a sui generis social phenomenon in
which contested systems of meaning serve as the connections
between physical features, races, and personal characteristics.
In other words, social meanings connect our faces to our souls.
Race is neither an essence nor an illusion, but rather an ongo-
ing, contradictory, self-reinforcing process subject to the
macro forces of social and political struggle and the micro ef-
fects of daily decisions.228
Though a scientific notion of race has largely been condemned,
and a social constructionist view of race has been endorsed within a
variety of intellectual communities,229 a fixed, biological, and inher-
ent notion of racial/ethnic identity remains salient. This has
continued despite the existence and recognition of “multi-racial-
ity,”230 even for those who subscribe to the conception that race is a
social construct.231 Generally speaking, an individual, consciously or
unconsciously, perceives her self-classified race, much like her sex,
as a primary component within her macro identity (e.g., profession,
religion, age, etc.) that is static and indisputable.  According to Omi
and Winant, “at the level of experience, of everyday life, race is an
228. Id. at 7.
229. Namely, Professor Sundquist argues that post-World War II, federal courts in the
United States have “generally embraced the modern rejection of biological theories of race
[and] [i]nstead . . . have focused on racial ‘markers’ such as ancestry, physical appearance,
language, outsider perception, and self-identification to determine race.” Sundquist, supra
note 218, at 256. However, with the meteoric rise of genetic ancestry tests, “contemporary
society has unquestionably assumed that race has some genetically-determinable essence.” Id.
at 257.
230. In its recognition of “multi-raciality,” and thus the fluidity of race and socio-legally
constructed status based upon racial difference, the colonial Virginia legislature in 1662 at-
tempted to promulgate a fixed racial and social status for mixed-race children of white and
Black parentage by codifying that such children’s racial and social status followed the
mother’s status. See EDMUND MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY AMERICAN FREEDOM 333 (1975).
231. See, e.g., Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (observing the
socially constructed and fluid nature of race while implicitly adhering to a biological notion
of race in its affirmation of the lower court’s holding that § 1981 “‘at a minimum,’ reaches
discrimination against an individual ‘because he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and
physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens.’”); see also Abdullahi v. Prada, 520
F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2008) (Judge Posner appealing to both fluid, social constructionist and
fixed, biological notions of race in recognizing that mutable, ethnic characteristics like one’s
accent can animate invidious treatment akin to racism).
134 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 47:1
almost indissoluble part of our identities. Our society is so thor-
oughly racialized that to be without racial identity is to be in danger
of having no identity. To be raceless is akin to being genderless.”232
Even those individuals who consciously and acutely subscribe to an
ideal that race is a malleable social construct, and whose exper-
iences bear this out, are not exempt from this default
understanding of one’s self-identity.233 Accordingly, it is important
to remember that lawyers advanced and adopted the actuality man-
date in intentional race discrimination cases. The lawyers arguing
and adjudicating these cases are human beings whose understand-
ings of racial identity were likely shaped by broader social, political,
legal, and economic forces, as well as specific personal experiences.
With this in mind, it is more fathomable that this legal position
and resulting statutory imperative, the actuality requirement, could
take shape. When confronted with a discrimination claim emanat-
ing from misperceptions about a plaintiff’s race, a lawyer who
232. Michael Omi & Howard Winant, On the Theoretical Concept of Race, in RACE AND REPRE-
SENTATION IN EDUCATION 5 (Cameron McCarthy & Warren Crichlow eds., 1993). Indeed,
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted the improbability of an individual navigating through
contemporary American society without the micro and macro operation of race shaping her
experiences. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (“Just as growing up in a particu-
lar region or having particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual’s
views, so too is one’s own, unique [racialized] experience . . . in a society, like our own, in
which race unfortunately still matters.”).
233. Indeed, to substantiate this point, a personal narrative is illustrative. I—a native
South Carolinian of known Native American, European, and African ancestry who self-identi-
fies as Black and American—actively embrace and recognize the socially constructed nature
of race. In fact, the contextual and fluid nature of racial classification has borne out in my
own personal experiences domestically and abroad. For example, on numerous occasions
observers have classified me as Ethiopian and Hispanic, namely with ethnic origins in both
Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries. When an observer begins to address me in their
native language or simply inquires, for example, whether I am Brazilian, Ethiopian, or Do-
minican (and they express shock when I answer in the negative), admittedly my immediate
reaction is one of curiosity. I wonder which of my physical markers or behaviors could have
engendered the observer’s perceptions. I recognize that my wonderment stems from an em-
bedded construction of my racial and ethnic identity as a Black American without Hispanic,
Iberian, or Ethiopian roots and my daily conscious and unconscious operation through this
lens. Intellectually, however, I am aware that this external classification of my race and
ethnicity is a contextual, subjective, and relational determination. When I have shared these
experiences with others, many listeners have affirmed the observer’s misclassification of my
race and ethnicity, implicitly appealing to a notion of fixed, physical racial and ethnic attrib-
utes in doing so. Listeners, even those who also embrace a social constructionist view of race,
have expressed that, due to my skin color, hair texture, or the shape of my nose and eyes, it is
plausible that observers could perceive me as Brazilian or as Ethiopian. Equally as many lis-
teners cannot fathom my racial or ethnic classification as anything other than what I have
self-reported: an externally reinforced self-perception which has been informed by broader
historical and contemporary constructions of race and ancestry in the United States, as well
as my family’s relatively fixed identity as Black Americans—or Americans of African descent
without any known Hispanic, Iberian, or Ethiopian ancestry or specific knowledge of our
African country of origin.
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represents either a plaintiff or an employer, or a judge deciding
such a case, may simply be unable to rationalize the proposition
that a plaintiff’s race was mistaken. Similarly, a lawyer or judge
might outright disbelieve that a plaintiff’s race could be mistaken,
based on her own preset conceptualizations of race and sex as
fixed, indisputable constructs. The development of a legal principle
in conformity with a lawmaker’s conscious or unconscious default
understanding of racial identity as a provable, unmistakable, fixed
construct could reflexively emerge.234
For example, the plaintiff in LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, Inc.,
like Burrage, alleged that he was harassed by his supervisor, who
perceived him as Mexican, even though the supervisor was aware
that the plaintiff self-identified as Italian-American.235 Specifically,
LaRocca claimed that his supervisor called him a “spic” and a “wet-
back.”236 Essentialist, fixed notions of race or ethnicity undergirded
the court’s decision to recognize LaRocca’s misperception discrimi-
nation claim. The court treated the plaintiff’s darker skin
complexion as a physical characteristic indicative of Italian ances-
try.237 Accordingly, the court held that LaRocca’s claim of national
origin harassment was actionable, as his actual national origin, or
rather his innate ethnic characteristic, triggered the alleged invidi-
ous treatment.238 In other words, but for LaRocca’s dark brown skin
color, a physical characteristic presumably inherent to his Italian
ancestry, LaRocca’s supervisor would not have perceived him as
Mexican and harassed him accordingly.239 Thus, by treating La-
Rocca’s brown skin complexion as a physical proxy for his Italian
ancestry, the court implicitly appealed to a notion that fixed, physi-
cal racial characteristics exist.
Hence, the underlying reasoning for the advancement of an ac-
tuality requirement in Perkins and its eventual adoption in Butler—
234. This understanding could also easily extend to sex misperception discrimination
claims.
235. LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 762 (D. Neb. 1999).
236. Id. at 766.
237. Id. at 770.
238. Id.
239. Id. Though the court accepted the plaintiff’s contention that his supervisor mis-
perceived him as Mexican during his employment, the court viewed the supervisor’s
misperception as an “isolated incident,” which was corrected; therefore, the harassment the
plaintiff suffered was not due to his misperceived ethnic identity but rather his actual ethnic
identity. Id. at 770–71. Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff’s Title VII and § 1981
hostile work environment claims were actionable since the supervisor developed and acted
upon a “reasonable” perception of the plaintiff’s ethnic identity due to one of his physical
characteristics—his darker skin color—which is supposedly inherent to individuals of Italian
descent, i.e., the plaintiff’s actual national origin. Id. at 770–71, 776–77. In so holding, the
court implicated an actuality requirement.
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both race and national origin discrimination cases—are quite plau-
sibly the product of conscious or subliminal conceptualizations
about race on the part of defense counsel and judges alike. Without
any patent reflection of the logic undergirding the development of
an actuality requirement or its natural consequences, a number of
federal district courts after Butler merely regurgitated the court’s
holding and rationale and imposed this onerous and unnecessary
mandate in categorical race and national origin discrimination
cases.240 The requirement was subsequently extended to religious
discrimination cases.241
Although a simple inability to visualize race as anything other
than a fixed, biological construct is the most obvious explanation
for the initial adoption of an actuality requirement in Title VII race
and national origin cases, a number of other possible explanations
for its continued implementation exist. More generally, judges de-
ciding misperception cases may have decided not to view
discrimination as a perception-based phenomenon in Title VII
cases, though expressly acknowledged in the ADA, for fear that do-
ing so will open the proverbial Pandora’s Box. Courts may be
fearful that individuals with deceitful motives will be encouraged to
disingenuously frame employment discrimination claims as stem-
ming from misperceptions about their respective identities. For
example, a plaintiff may insincerely claim that an employer mis-
perceived her as Native American and appropriate racially offensive
comments about Native Americans and/or differential treatment of
Native Americans in the workplace, arguably not intentionally
aimed at the plaintiff, to support her discrimination claim.242
It is also plausible that lawyers arguing and judges deciding these
cases are incorrectly conceptualizing the alleged discrimination em-
anating from misperceptions about one’s race or religion, for
example, as less injurious than discrimination implicating one’s ac-
tual racial or religious identity. They may believe that the plaintiff
endures minimal, ancillary harm rather than a direct, personal of-
fense since the invidious treatment is ostensibly not animated by, or
is unrelated to, her self-ascribed racial or religious identity. Accord-
ingly, courts may be viewing misperception discrimination cases as
third-party discrimination cases, which are cases wherein the plain-
tiffs are seeking redress for the unlawful discrimination that other
240. See cases cited supra note 29.
241. See El v. Max Daetwyler Corp., No. 3:09-CV-415, 2011 WL 1769805 (W.D.N.C. May 9,
2011) aff’d, 451 Fed. App’x 257 (4th Cir. 2011).
242. See, e.g., Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Wood v. Freeman Decorating Servs., Inc.,
No. 3:08-CV-00375-LRH-RAM, 2009 WL 4836455 (D. Nev. July 30, 2009).
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individuals have suffered rather than any discrimination that they
have endured directly. Prototypical third-party cases are sex dis-
crimination cases initiated by male plaintiffs on behalf of women or
race discrimination cases brought on behalf of non-white employ-
ees by white plaintiffs.243 Some courts have not recognized these
third-party claims, reasoning that an employer’s discrimination
against individuals based on Title VII’s proscribed bases indirectly
harms third-party claimants, as such discrimination is unrelated to
the plaintiffs’ protected status. Correspondingly, these courts have
held that Title VII protects an individual against proscribed discrim-
ination specifically aimed at her because of her protected status.244
It is not a far-fetched possibility that courts may be conceptualiz-
ing misperception discrimination claims as akin to these third-party
discrimination claims. For example, in Wood v. Freeman Decorating
Services, Inc., counsel for the defendant-employer argued that the
plaintiff, who alleged suffering a racially hostile work environment,
did not have standing under Title VII because he could not prove
his self-proclaimed Native American identity.245 To undermine the
veracity of Mr. Wood’s racial classification as Native American, the
defendant-employer proffered evidence that Wood self-identified as
Hispanic on a military admissions form on which American Indian
was a choice.246 Additionally, the defendant-employer argued that
Wood could not provide any documentation that he was Native
American. The only proof he could offer was his adopted mother’s
243. See generally Camille Gear Rich, Marginal Whiteness, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1497 (2010) (cate-
gorizing third-party race discrimination claims initiated by white plaintiffs as “interracial
solidarity” claims and providing a more nuanced conceptualization of the injuries suffered by
whites because of an employer’s minority-targeted discrimination and thus arguing for the
legal recognition of such claims).
244. See, e.g., Jackson v. Deen, No. 4:12-CV-139, 2013 WL 4078292, at *2, *6–7 (S.D. Ga.
Aug. 12, 2013) (holding that a  female plaintiff, one who self-identified as white yet was ar-
guably misperceived as African American or mixed-race, did not have standing under Title
VII and § 1981 to challenge the derogatory comments and treatment aimed at her African-
American co-workers, though she claimed she was personally affected by the alleged racially
discriminatory and subordinating work environment. The court held that the plaintiff was
“not an aggrieved party under Title VII because her interests are not those arguably sought to
be protected by [the] statute” since none of the “racially offensive comments were either
directed toward [her] or made with intent to harass her.” Notably, in so holding, the court
relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson v. North American Stainless Steel, later
discussed in Part V.C); Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205, 1207, 1209 (4th Cir.
1998) (en banc) (Luttig, J., concurring) (finding that, since plaintiffs “assert[ed] only the
rights of third-parties to be free from race or sex-based discrimination in the workplace,”
white male plaintiffs did not have standing under Title VII to sue for sex and race-based
hostile work environment claims based upon the alleged harassment of Black and female
employees) cert. denied, 524 U.S. 927 (1998).
245. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Wood v. Freeman Decorating Servs., Inc., No. 3:08-
CV-00375-LRH-RAM, 2009 WL 4836455 (D. Nev. July 30, 2009).
246. Id.
138 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 47:1
hearsay admissions to him that his natural parents were Native
American.247 The defense further contended that Wood’s self-classi-
fication as Native American was an insincere and self-serving
attempt to capitalize on alleged racially offensive conduct toward,
and statements about, Native Americans in the workplace.248
As a result, the defendant-employer sought the dismissal of Mr.
Wood’s Title VII case and asserted that his hostile work environ-
ment claim failed as a matter of law because he was unable to show
that “he was subjected to racially derogatory comments based on his
race.”249 In support of its contention that Title VII intentional dis-
crimination cases are actionable only when the alleged invidious,
differential treatment is related to the plaintiff’s protected status,
the defendant-employer cited to Title VII third-party sex and race
discrimination cases wherein courts held that the plaintiffs did not
have standing to bring a discrimination action on behalf of other
individuals since the alleged discrimination was not based on the
plaintiffs’ sex or race, respectively.250 Notably, however, the court
held that Mr. Wood’s race discrimination claim was actionable. Yet,
in doing so, the court relied in part upon a case wherein the court
upheld a third-party discrimination claim.251 Thus, some other
courts may also be viewing misperception discrimination cases as
akin to third-party cases.
Additionally, the emergence of an anti-anticlassificationist inter-
pretation of Title VII could be the result of a haphazard,
mechanical application of the protected class approach despite the
Supreme Court’s caveats to the contrary.252 Conversely, to the ex-
tent that courts misconstrue claims of misperception discrimination
as radically different from conventionally framed claims of discrimi-
nation, courts’ anti-anticlassificationist interpretation could also be
the manifestation of what Professor Jed Rubenfeld describes as an
“anti-antidiscrimination agenda,” whereby courts cite to textual
grounds to quash a plaintiff’s theory of discrimination “perceived to
take antidiscrimination ideology too far”253 by “extend[ing] antidis-





251. See Wood v. Freeman Decorating Servs., Inc., No. 3:08-CV-00375-LRH-RAM, 2010
WL 653764, at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 2010).
252. See supra Part III.B.
253. Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1142–43
(2002).
254. Id. at 1143.
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Similarly, Title VII misperception discrimination claims may fall
victim to judicial biases against employment claims more gener-
ally.255 Professor Michael Selmi asserts that, in part, judges’ “general
misperception . . . that employment cases are easy—not difficult—
to win, and [that] the volume of employment discrimination cases
is said to reflect an excessive amount of costly nuisance suits” ac-
count for employment discrimination cases’ relative lack of
success.256 Selmi maintains that judicial biases against discrimina-
tion lawsuits, though different depending on the particular cause of
action, also explain employment discrimination cases’ high rate of
failure.257 For example, before Congress amended the Americans
with Disabilities Act in 2008,258 in response to what they viewed as
an expansive act, courts “trimmed [the Act’s] scope as a way of fer-
reting out some of the more extravagant claims, but in the process
have excluded many claims that were clearly intended to fall within
the statute’s ambit.”259 Moreover, as it pertains to race discrimina-
tion cases, “which are generally the most difficult claim for a
plaintiff to succeed on, courts often seem mired in a belief that the
claims are generally unmeritorious, brought by whining plaintiffs
who have been given too many, not too few, breaks along the
way.”260 Accordingly, the reproduction of an anti-anticlassificationist
statutory interpretation and attendant actuality requirement in pre-
viously mentioned intentional discrimination cases may be
indicative of pervasive judicial bias against employment discrimina-
tion cases and a concerted attempt to restrain further expansion of
Title VII’s scope and the resulting litigation.
This latter possibility, indeed, appears more supportable in re-
cent cases, like Burrage and El, wherein the courts boldly
proclaimed that categorical discrimination claims deriving from
misperceptions would not be recognized until Congress expressly
instructed the courts otherwise by amending Title VII. Meanwhile,
the Burrage and El courts advanced tenuous analytical reasoning to
ensure that actionable claims of invidious, differential treatment
comport with an individual’s self-classified or provable protected
status in the meantime.
In doing so, such an anti-anticlassificationist interpretation of Ti-
tle VII creates a legal fiction that the only rightful beneficiaries of
255. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61
LA. L. REV. 555 (2001).
256. Id. at 556.
257. Id.
258. See supra Part III.A.
259. Selmi, supra note 255, at 556.
260. Id. See generally Parker, supra note 76.
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Title VII’s protections against workplace discrimination are individ-
uals who allege invidious, differential treatment on the basis of
their self-ascribed identity. Courts are mistaken in their belief that
by recognizing misperception discrimination cases, statutory pro-
tection will be extended to a new class of individuals.
Fundamentally, the only class of individuals unable to benefit from
Title VII’s proscriptions consists of those discriminated against by
entities not covered by Title VII.261 Nonetheless, courts like Burrage
and El have denied Title VII protection to misperception discrimi-
nation plaintiffs, even at the expense of undermining longstanding
legal principles as well as Title VII’s meaning and purpose, and de-
spite the risk of engendering paradoxical, “absurd results”262 for
categorical discrimination cases on the basis of an individual’s race,
color, sex, national origin, and religion.
Title VII extends protection and relief to individuals suffering
invidious, differential treatment perpetrated by a covered employer
because of the statute’s forbidden criteria, regardless of whether
such categorical discrimination derives from an accurate or inaccu-
rate categorization of an individual’s racial, ethnic, gender, or
religious identity. Although it is likely presumed that everyone will
self-identify as a member of a particular socially constructed racial
group, or as male or female, not everyone will (or does) classify as a
member of a singular racial, ethnic, color, or religious group, or
even classify themselves as simply male or female.263 Moreover,
one’s racial, religious, ethnic, and gender self-identification can
261. For example, employers with less than fifteen employees are expressly exempted
from Title VII coverage. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006). Businesses and enterprises on or in
close proximity of Native American reservations that afford an employment preference to
Native Americans are also exempt from Title VII coverage. See id. § 2000e-2(i).
262. Per time-honored Supreme Court jurisprudence, the prevailing rule courts are to
apply when interpreting statutes is that the “plain language” of the statute governs except
when giving effect to the plain language produces “absurd or glaringly unjust” results. See
United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984) (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 450 (1932)). See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387,
2398–408 (2003), for the origins of the absurdity doctrine in addition to the seminal Su-
preme Court cases in which the Court appropriated the absurdity doctrine when literal
application of a statute’s plain language led to nonsensical results. Professor Manning posits
that the absurdity doctrine “rests on a judicial judgment that a particular statutory outcome,
although prescribed by the text, would sharply contradict society’s ‘common sense’ of moral-
ity, fairness, or some other deeply held value.” Id. at 2405–06.
263. For example, some individuals may not classify themselves in singular racial terms
like Black and white but rather as mixed-race or multiracial due to their diverse racial or
ethnic heritage. Similarly, individuals may not identify as either female or male due to their
intersex identity. See generally Ilana Gelfman, Because of Intersex: Intersexuality, Title VII, and the
Reality of Discrimination “Because of . . . (Perceived) Sex,” 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 55
(2010).
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change throughout the course of one’s life. This lack of fixed classi-
fication or membership within a protected class does not render an
individual unprotected from invidious, differential treatment in
the workplace on Title VII’s proscribed bases. Correspondingly,
differential, invidious treatment based upon the statute’s forbidden
criteria that does not neatly comport with an individual’s actual self-
identification, yet is specifically aimed at the individual, is not be-
yond Title VII’s remedial scope. Indeed, Congress and the Supreme
Court made clear that the purpose of Title VII is to protect all
Americans from categorical discrimination engaged in by covered
employers on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, and
religion.264
IV. WHAT LIES AHEAD: NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS
OF AN ACTUALITY REQUIREMENT
Though countless negative consequences could ensue from cer-
tain courts’ unwillingness to follow the mandates of Congress and
the Supreme Court,265 this Part identifies a few of the most crucial.
These three unexamined, yet critically important, implications of
courts’ imposition of an actuality requirement in misperception dis-
crimination cases are the emergence of a minimalist actuality
defense, the resuscitation of identity adjudication in all categorical
discrimination cases, and the reification of race as a fixed, biologi-
cal construct. With respect to the evolution of identity adjudication,
this Part specifically investigates racial determination litigation in
264. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976), in which
the court held that Title VII and § 1981 prohibited discrimination against white men and
women. The court proclaimed that its holding was in accordance with “uncontradicted legis-
lative history to the effect that Title VII was intended to ‘cover white men and white women
and all Americans.’” Id. at 280 (quoting Congressman Celler’s remarks at 110 CONG. REC.
2578 (1964)).
265. As seen in El, courts’ imposition of an actuality requirement in pre-discovery stages,
like in a court’s evaluation of whether to dismiss a case per a 12(b)(6) motion, may discour-
age plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ counsel from bringing meritorious Title VII claims of unlawful
race, religion, color, sex, or national origin discrimination. Indeed, if courts apply the plausi-
bility standard articulated in Iqbal/Twombly in misperception discrimination cases and thus
dismiss misperception discrimination cases pre-discovery, then they signal that the only plau-
sible discrimination is that which derives from an individual’s “actual” protected status.
Accordingly, this confluence of procedural and substantive law erroneously conveys that cate-
gorical discrimination emanating from misperceptions about the plaintiff’s protected status
is not only inconceivable but also irremediable under Title VII. Additionally, courts could
impose an actuality requirement and thus require plaintiffs to prove their membership in a
protected class to be awarded protection under current and future federal and state antidis-
crimination laws. See supra note 175.
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categorical race266 discrimination cases and an attendant conse-
quence: the reification of race as a stable, biological construct.
A. The Creation of a Minimalist Actuality Defense in Categorical
Discrimination Cases
Despite specific contentions that the plaintiff conceivably suf-
fered invidious, differential treatment on the basis of proscribed
characteristics under Title VII, several federal courts have decreed
that Title VII plaintiffs are only protected against unlawful discrimi-
nation if they experience invidious, differential treatment
occasioned by the defendant’s accurate classification of the plain-
tiff’s racial, religious, ethnic, color, or gender identity. In doing so,
these courts have afforded employers a minimalist defense even in
otherwise viable cases of discrimination resulting from an em-
ployer’s subjective perceptions or misperceptions of an individual’s
race, color, national origin, religion, or sex. Essentially, employers
need not deny the allegations of discriminatory treatment on the
basis of proscribed characteristics. Rather, employers can effectively
defend a case of categorical discrimination on the grounds that the
alleged invidious, differential treatment did not relate to the indi-
vidual’s actual or self-ascribed race, religion, national origin, color,
or sex. However, whether invidious treatment derives from a plain-
tiff’s actual or misperceived status is irrelevant and should not bear
on the viability of her discrimination case.
As Professor Craig Robert Senn clarifies:
employers who [are either “accurate discriminators” or “erro-
neous discriminators”] are identical in discriminatory intent
and action. An “accurate discriminator” and an “erroneous
discriminator” are each motivated to act based on a protected
trait, and each actually manifests that intent in the form of a
tangible, adverse employment action. Of course, the differ-
ence between these employers is the accuracy of the perception
of protected status—one subset’s employers happened to be
“right” while the other subset’s employers happened to be
“wrong.” But, the “erroneous discriminators” are—to be
blunt—still discriminators.267
266. Due to the intersectional nature of race, national origin, and religion, racial deter-
mination litigation could also denote the determination of an individual’s identity who
alleges discrimination on the basis of religion or national origin. See infra note 283.
267. Senn, supra note 148, at 856.
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Indeed, as one federal district court in a recent misperception race
discrimination case opined, it is “as offensive as it is incorrect” for
an employer to contend that it is blameless on the issue of discrimi-
nation simply because the employer’s perception of the plaintiff’s
race and resulting negative treatment did not align with the plain-
tiff’s actual racial identity.268 Unfortunately, in a series of
intentional discrimination cases, federal courts reached the oppo-
site result. These courts have endorsed the patently erroneous
prescription that an individual’s statutory right to be free from ra-
cial, religious, ethnic, color, and sex discrimination under Title VII
is not conditioned upon whether an employer conceivably discrimi-
nated against an individual on the basis of a proscribed
characteristic but rather upon the precision with which an em-
ployer’s perception corresponds to an individual’s self-ascribed or
provable racial, religious, ethnic, color, or gender identity and
whether the employer treats her accordingly.269
This prima facie actuality requirement indicates a divergence
from assessing the “critical question of discrimination”270 in Title
VII intentional discrimination cases. Not only does an actuality re-
quirement leave a Title VII plaintiff wanting for protection against
discrimination, but it may also leave her unprotected against retalia-
tion for opposing such discriminatory treatment. In some
268. Boutros v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., LLC, No. 10-C-8196, 2013 WL 3834405, at *7 (N.D.
Ill. July 24, 2013). In this case, the plaintiff, who identified as Assyrian, alleged that he suf-
fered a hostile work environment and was terminated because the defendant-employer
misperceived him as Arab. Id. at *6–7. The court rejected the employer’s defense that it
could not be held liable for unlawful race discrimination under Title VII because it was not
aware of the plaintiff’s racial identity. Id. at *7.
269. As seen in Burrage, such a condition will have a deleterious effect on individuals who
self-classify as mixed-race or multi-racial. Indeed, Professor Sharona Hoffman observes that
“[t]he growing population of individuals of mixed ‘racial’ backgrounds makes the question
of ‘race’ identity in American society increasingly complex and the idea that there are fixed
‘racial’ categories increasingly outdated.” Sharona Hoffman, Is There a Place for “Race” as a
Legal Concept?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1093, 1141 (2004). In employment discrimination cases in-
volving plaintiffs like Burrage who identify as mixed-race, courts generally place such
plaintiffs into a monoracial category and analyze the case accordingly. Professor Nancy
Leong critiques the “judicial erasure” of mixed-race plaintiffs and the particular animus and
resulting discrimination that mixed-race individuals endure. See Nancy Leong, Judicial Erasure
of Mixed-Race Discrimination, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 469 (2010). See generally Ken Nakasu Davison,
Note and Comment, The Mixed-Race Experience: Treatment of Racially Mischaracterized Individuals
Under Title VII, 12 ASIAN L.J. 161, 176 (2005) (arguing that courts’ emphasis on whether a
plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim “fits within traditional notions of race” rather
than on employer’s intent is not only misplaced but is also especially problematic for mixed-
race individuals, as the “tendency to mischaracterize a person’s race is heightened for mixed-
race people” because “[they] are often not easily identifiable based on stereotypical indica-
tors”); Scott Rives, Comment, Multiracial Work: Handing Over the Discretionary Judicial Tool of
Multiracialism, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1310 (2012) (arguing that mixed-race plaintiffs should
be accorded the task of “fram[ing] race as he or she desires for the initial complaint”).
270. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (emphasis added).
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jurisdictions, to assert an actionable claim of retaliation under Title
VII’s opposition clause, a plaintiff must demonstrate a reasonable,
good faith belief that the alleged discriminatory conduct violated
Title VII.271 However, as Professor Deborah Brake and Professor
Joanna Grossman synthesize:
[i]n addition to a reasonable factual basis, an employee who
opposes discrimination also must have a legally sound belief
that Title VII was violated in order to secure the law’s protec-
tion from retaliation. The reasonableness of the employee’s
belief is measured by existing law, and courts charge
employees with full knowledge of existing law—including
circuit-specific precedents—even if an employee had a good
faith belief that the law reached farther.272
Accordingly, the reasonableness, and thereby the legal recognition,
of a Title VII plaintiff’s opposition claim is contingent upon
whether the underlying challenged conduct constitutes an actiona-
ble claim of discrimination per existing Title VII case law and not
upon whether a lay person would deem the challenged conduct
within the province of Title VII’s proscriptions.273 Plausibly, a court
could hold that a Title VII plaintiff who is retaliated against because
she opposed invidious, differential treatment emanating from the
employer’s misperceptions about her (or another individual’s) pro-
tected status does not have an actionable claim of retaliation in
light of legal precedent that declares that the underlying chal-
lenged conduct—misperception discrimination—is beyond Title
VII’s scope.
The confluence of these outcomes—no protection against dis-
crimination and no protection against retaliation suffered for those
opposing misperception discrimination—will engender unbridled
invidious, differential treatment in the workplace motivated by mis-
perceptions about employees’ protected status and activity, as such
categorical discrimination can ensue without legal consequence. As
a result, a minimalist, actuality defense signals to employers that
271. See, e.g., Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass’n Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994).
272. Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII As A Rights-Claiming
System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 919 (2008).
273. See, e.g., McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-CV-0196-CC, 1996 WL 755779, at *1–2
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996) (rejecting plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim by holding that the
plaintiff’s opposition to her employer-temporary staffing agency’s policy of not referring
“qualified applicants with ‘braided’ hair styles for employment positions” was not protected
activity because such policy as a matter of law did not violate Title VII’s proscriptions against
race-based employment practices).
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they need not attempt to prevent or remedy misperception discrim-
ination, since some courts have concluded that such treatment does
not violate Title VII. Therefore, this legal mandate effectively con-
travenes dual aims of Title VII and like antidiscrimination laws:
deterring employers from engaging in discrimination and encour-
aging employers to critically examine their discriminatory behaviors
and decisions.274
B. The Emergence of Identity Adjudication and the Reification of
Biological Race in Categorical Discrimination Cases
The imposition of an actuality requirement in cases of invidious,
differential treatment unnecessarily resuscitates litigation to affirm
the plaintiff’s actual identity. The contours of identity litigation are
best illustrated in the race discrimination context. The United
States possesses an extensive body of racial determination jurispru-
dence. For the vast majority of U.S. history, the legal determination
of race has been essential to the provision or denial of political,
social, legal, and economic rights and privileges. According to Pro-
fessor Ariela Gross, “[d]etermining racial identity [has been] about
raising some people up . . . to put others down; enslaving some
people to free others; taking land from some people to give it to
others; robbing people of their dignity to give others a sense of
supremacy.”275 Consequently, one’s classification as a free person or
a slave,276 as well as the ability to ride in one train car or another,277
274. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g, 513 U.S. 352, 358 (explaining that “Con-
gress designed the remedial measures in [Title VII and the ADEA] to serve as a ‘spur or
catalyst’ to cause employers ‘to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices
and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges’ of discrimination.”) (quot-
ing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1975). In McKennon, the high
court also noted that “[d]eterrence is one object of [Title VII and the ADEA].” Id. at 358.
275. ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA
9 (Harvard Univ. Press 2008).
276. See, e.g., Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134 (1806); see also Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, Multiracialism and the Social Construction of Race: The Story of Hudgins v.
Wrights, in RACE LAW STORIES 147 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon Wayne Carbado eds., 2008)
(providing a detailed analysis of this well-known freedom suit).
277. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
146 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 47:1
exercise the right to vote,278 marry,279 serve on a jury,280 attend one
public school or another,281 and become a naturalized citizen282
have all depended upon the legal determination of the individual’s
race.
Mandating that plaintiffs prove their race in categorical race, na-
tional origin, and some religious283 discrimination cases essentially
revives age-old trials of racial determination. In her seminal work
on racial determination cases adjudicated by nineteenth century
courts in the American South, Professor Ariela Gross reveals that, in
determining an individual’s race when challenged, judges and ju-
ries assessed evidence related to one’s physical features (which
often included physical inspections), the racial reputation of one’s
parents and other family members, and one’s racial reputation in
society, which was largely based upon community members’ percep-
tions of one’s racial associations in social settings as well as other
behaviors and norms that signified race, i.e., racial performance.284
278. See, e.g., People v. Dean, 14 Mich. 406 (Mich. 1866).
279. See, e.g., State v. Pass, 121 P.2d 882, 883–84 (1942) (upholding the constitutionality
of an Arizona anti-miscegenation law legally voiding marriages between “persons of Cauca-
sian blood, or their descendants, [and] Negroes, Hindus, Mongolians, members of the Malay
race, or Indians, and their descendants” and thereby nullifying the marriage between a crimi-
nal defendant who testified to having European, Piute and Mexican ancestry and his wife
who testified to having Spanish, French, and Mexican ancestry).
280. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 558 (S.C. Ct. App. 1831).
281. See, e.g., Wall v. Oyster, 36 App. D.C. 50 (D.C. Cir. 1910); see also Rice v. Gong Lum,
104 So. 105, 110 (Miss. 1925) (concluding that Chinese persons were “colored” within the
meaning of the Mississippi state constitution and thus mandating that the daughter of the
Chinese plaintiff attend the public secondary school for “colored” children rather than the
school assigned for “white” children).
282. See, e.g., Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922) (holding that a Japanese immi-
grant was not “white” for the purposes of becoming a naturalized citizen pursuant to the
Naturalization Act, which only permitted  “free whites” and African descendants to become
naturalized U.S. citizens).
283. See, e.g., Smith v. Specialty Pool Contractors, No. 02:07-CV-1464, 2008 WL 4410163,
at *6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2008) (denying summary judgment in Title VII race and religious
discrimination case where plaintiff, a practicing Catholic, alleged racial and religious harass-
ment because his father was Jewish). This case illustrates the conflation of race and religion
in that one’s racial and religious identities can be viewed as indistinguishable from one an-
other. Though the court did not mandate a showing of actuality, in light of this conflation of
race and religion, this case demonstrates the possibility of litigating an individual’s race in
instances that can be likewise characterized as religious discrimination.
284. Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Cen-
tury South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998) (exploring racial determination trials that took place in
the American South during the 1800s). See generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (N.Y. Univ. Press 1996) (examining “prerequisite cases” in
which federal courts adjudicated one’s “whiteness” in order to become a naturalized Ameri-
can citizen); Greene, supra note 220 (examining historical and contemporary racial
determination cases to illustrate that determining one’s “Blackness” is not based upon
methodical application of the infamous “one-drop” rule but rather is an exercise that is so-
cial, relational, and contextual in nature and is based upon an assessment of one’s physical
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In contemporary misperception cases, plaintiffs may be similarly re-
quired to produce evidence of their ancestry, racial reputation in
society, racial statuses, racial associations, and racial perform-
ance.285 A plaintiff may also need to submit to an inspection of her
physical appearance without an ostensibly legitimate purpose.
Furthermore, the Burrage court advanced an essentialist require-
ment applicable to national origin or race discrimination claimants.
A plaintiff must demonstrate that the ascertainable trait(s), which
presumably triggered an employer’s invidious, differential treat-
ment, are traceable to a “personal characteristic common to people
of a certain national origin [or the plaintiff’s] national origin, it-
self.”286 Therefore, for a viable claim of national origin or race
discrimination to exist, Title VII plaintiffs would need to demon-
strate that an observable physical characteristic, like a particular
skin complexion or a non-physical characteristic, or the use of a
particular language, is a “common, personal characteristic” shared
by individuals of a particular national origin or ancestry. This stan-
dard fails to acknowledge that physical or non-physical proxies that
an observer uses to assign a racial or ethnic identity of another per-
son are experientially shaped by broader social forces (inclusive of
political and legal forces), the observer’s personal encounters with
racial, ethnic, and color classification, and the contexts in which
such classifications are made. Thus, the process of determining an-
other’s race and ethnicity is quite individualistic, subjective, and
often idiosyncratic. Nonetheless, the revival of racial determination
litigation in all categorical discrimination cases is a real conse-
quence of courts’ anti-anticlassificationist interpretation of
antidiscrimination laws.
Indeed, a conventionally framed discrimination case, Leonard v.
Katsinas,287 evidences that reputational, physical, and associational
evidence of a plaintiff’s actual racial or ethnic identity can be re-
quired. In Leonard v. Katsinas, the plaintiffs, who identified as
Native American, claimed that the defendant denied their entry
into a restaurant on the basis of their race.288 They alleged that one
of the defendants told them expressly that “he was barring them
appearance, conduct, and associations within a broader historical and contemporary socio-
legal context of race relations and hierarchy).
285. See Ariela J. Gross, Reply, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 497 (2010) (“[A]ll of the various
bases of identity—appearance, ancestry, reputation, status, performance, science, and as-
sociations—have continued to be important throughout U.S. history to this day.”).
286. Burrage v. FedEx Freight, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-2755, 2012 WL 1068794, at *7 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 29, 2012).
287. No. 05-1069, 2007 WL 1106136 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2007).
288. Id. at *13.
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from the [r]estaurant because they [were] Native American.”289
The plaintiffs in Leonard brought their race discrimination claims
pursuant to § 1981, which provides that “[a]ll persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right . . . to
make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”290
To establish this racial discrimination claim under § 1981, the
plaintiffs were required to demonstrate: “[they were members] of a
racial minority; . . . defendants had the intent to discriminate on
the basis of race; and . . . the discrimination concerned the making
or enforcing of a contract.”291 The defendant specifically argued
that the plaintiffs could not satisfy the first element of their racial
discrimination case because not all of the plaintiffs could prove that
they were “racially Native American.”292 In other words, the defen-
dant contended that the plaintiffs’ claims of race discrimination
automatically failed since not all of them could produce proof that
they were actually Native American.
Fittingly, the Leonard court ruminated, “if there is evidence that
an alleged discriminator believed the plaintiffs to be members of a
member class—in this case, Native Americans—and discriminated
against them on this belief, should it even matter if the plaintiffs are
actually members of that protected class or not?”293 At the summary
judgment stage, the court employed the reasonable basis test first
adopted in Perkins v. Lake County Department of Utilities as previously
discussed.294 According to the Perkins court, satisfaction of the rea-
sonable basis test establishes the initial prima facie element in the
289. Id.
290. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006).
291. Leonard, 2007 WL 1106136, at *7 (quoting Pourghoraishi v. Flying J Inc., 449 F.3d
751, 756 (7th Cir. 2006)).
292. Id. at *8. The defendants further contended that they had no knowledge that plain-
tiffs were Native American. Id. at *13.
293. Id. at *9.
294. 860 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ohio 1994). Like a number of courts in misperception
discrimination cases, the court’s adoption of a reasonable basis test evidences a strong alle-
giance to formulaic satisfaction of the prima facie elements articulated in McDonnell Douglas
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). However, unlike the courts in misperception discrimination
cases examined in Parts II-III, the Perkins court attempted to set forth a more liberal require-
ment for maintaining a prima facie case of discrimination, which acknowledged the socially
constructed nature of race. See Perkins, 860 F. Supp. 1262. Several courts since Perkins have
applied the reasonable basis test in intentional race and national origin cases. See, e.g., Lewis
v. State of Delaware Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, 948 F. Supp. 352 (D. Del 1996); Greene v.
Swain Cnty. P’ship for Health, 342 F. Supp. 2d 442, 451 (W.D.N.C. 2004); Lebyed v. DTG
Operations, Inc., No. 5:08-CV-00438-FL, 2010 WL 1332417 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 22, 2010); see also
Wood v. Freeman Decorating Servs., Inc., No. 3:08-CV-00375-LRH-RAM, 2010 WL 653764, at
*4–5 (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 2010) (relying in part on Perkins’ reasonable basis test in concluding
that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that the employer could have correctly or
mistakenly perceived him as Native American since the plaintiff “identified himself with
American Indian culture and heritage” and his co-workers harassed and aimed derogatory
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McDonnell Douglas analysis by demonstrating membership in a pro-
tected class.295 Doing so requires that a plaintiff put forth objective
physical appearance, associational, and reputational evidence to
support her claim that the employer reasonably perceived her as a
member of a particular protected class under Title VII.296 Applying
the Perkins court’s reasonable basis test, the Leonard court held that
“a focus on the perception of the alleged discriminator is appropriate
at [the summary judgment] stage.”297 Therefore, as long as plain-
tiffs could present “some objective evidence” that led the defendant
to believe that the plaintiffs were Native American and deny them
entry into the restaurant because of this belief, plaintiffs could pro-
ceed to trial.298 Regrettably, however, the Leonard court decided
that the reasonable basis approach would not apply at trial. In or-
der to ultimately prevail in their race discrimination case, the court
held that the plaintiffs would have to prove “through competent
evidence, that they [were] members of the protected class.”299 Even
though the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant admitted denying
them entry to the restaurant because he perceived them as Native
American, the court mandated that the plaintiffs would have to
prove that they were actually Native American to proceed with their
race discrimination case.
It is important to take note that in contemporary legal contexts
beyond categorical discrimination cases, the determination of
whether an individual is Native American is critical, as it determines
eligibility for a various governmental benefits and preferences ac-
corded to Native Americans.300 For example, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, the federal agency that administers federal benefits and
services for Native American tribes, has promulgated regulations
requiring one-half or one-quarter Native American blood or ances-
try to qualify for governmental hiring preferences, government-
sponsored employment assistance, educational loans and grants,
comments at him because of his association). Thus, inconspicuously, three discrete standards
for statutory protection have emerged in Title VII intentional race, national origin, and relig-
ion discrimination cases: a prima facie showing of actuality; a prima facie showing of
objective reasonableness; and a prima facie showing of the employer’s perception or mis-
perception about the individual’s protected status. Ultimately, courts or Congress will need
to resolve this quandary. Meanwhile, this Article endeavors toward a more cohesive conceptu-
alization of Title VII protection for courts to appropriate in categorical discrimination cases.
See infra Part V.C.
295. See Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1278.
296. See id.
297. Leonard v. Katsinas, No. 05-1069, 2007 WL 1106136, at *12 (C.D. Ill. April 11, 2007).
298. Id. (quoting Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1278).
299. Id. at *13.
300. See Margo S. Brownell, Who is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Question at the
Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 275, 277 (2000–2001).
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and adult vocational training, among other benefits.301 In addition
to a specific quantum of Native American lineal ancestors, some
federal and state laws require that individuals prove their member-
ship or enrollment within a recognized tribe to qualify for benefits
and preferences reserved for Native Americans.302
Despite its irrelevance to the issue of whether an employer’s sub-
jective perceptions of the plaintiff elicited negative biases and
resulted in invidious, differential treatment, the Leonard court re-
quired the plaintiffs to prove their Native American ancestry and/
or tribal membership like individuals seeking governmental bene-
fits and services designated for Native Americans (as well as tribal
recognition).303 In justifying its imposition of an actuality require-
ment and attendant adjudication of plaintiffs’ indigeneity at trial,
the Leonard court reasoned similarly to, but less emphatically than,
some courts in Title VII misperception discrimination cases men-
tioned previously. The court opined that since “Congress has not
elected to amend Title VII or § 1981 to correspondingly widen the
scope of statutory protection[, this] is some suggestion that [Con-
gress] regards actual membership within a protected class a
mandatory requirement to prevail under those statutes.”304
As Leonard v. Katsinas illustrates, the imposition of an actuality
requirement and attendant identity adjudication are categorically
wrong developments not limited to misperception discrimination
cases. Courts have also applied an anti-anticlassificationist interpre-
tation of federal antidiscrimination laws, and thereby mandated
evidentiary proof of a plaintiff’s racial identity, in conventionally
framed discrimination cases under Title VII and § 1981. As a result,
defendants are able to defend all categorical discrimination cases
by contesting the plaintiff’s self-ascribed identity. Therefore, if
courts continue to reify an actuality requirement in misperception
and conventionally framed discrimination cases, courts will become
inundated with identity adjudication.
301. Id. at 280–81.
302. See id.
303. Professor Gould explains that:
[m]ost tribal constitutions require that a person seeking membership must have a
specified quantum of tribal blood, or, without regard to blood quantum, must be de-
scended from a member of the tribe. The tribal constitution for the Fort Apache
reservation, for example, requires at least one-half degree White Mountain Apache
blood.
L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compromising Sovereignty and the
Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53, 60 n.23 (1994).
304. Leonard v. Katsinas, No. 05-1069, 2007 WL 1106136, at *13 (C.D. Ill. April 11, 2007).
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It is difficult to imagine that Congress envisioned what the court
in Leonard v. Katsinas pronounced to race and national origin dis-
crimination plaintiffs: to seek redress for alleged invidious,
differential treatment suffered because of their racial identities,
plaintiffs must engage in a racial determination trial whereby plain-
tiffs and defendants respectively will attempt to prove and disprove
the plaintiffs’ race through the presentation of myriad forms of evi-
dence. To prove the plaintiff’s racial or ethnic identity, plaintiffs
and defendants in discrimination cases may present a variety of evi-
dence. For example, a plaintiff could simply proffer documents on
which she self-declares her race. Alternatively, a plaintiff could put
forward reputational evidence via lay witness testimony of the plain-
tiff’s racial reputation based upon her racial associations or
declarations within particular communities and contexts. She might
offer genealogical evidence based upon lay or expert witness testi-
mony, family trees, ancestral records, census records, or even DNA
ancestry tests results. Finally, she might produce physical evidence
informed by lay or expert witness examinations of the plaintiff’s
physical appearance, just to name a few examples. Such litigation is
unnecessary and is uniquely harmful, as it reinforces a discredited
notion of race as a biological, “immutable,”305 and predictable con-
struct in that one’s race will necessarily manifest through his or her
phenotype, conduct, and associations.306
Moreover, adjudicating one’s race unnecessarily increases litiga-
tion costs, encumbers judicial resources, and burdens
discrimination plaintiffs. In doing so, it fails to address the central
issue in cases of invidious, differential treatment:307 “whether for
any reason, a racially discriminatory employment decision has been
305. I have previously critiqued the judiciary’s continued reinforcement of the “immuta-
bility” doctrine in Title VII race and national origin cases, arguing that this concept “defies
society’s understanding of race historically and contemporarily.” Greene, supra note 81, at
1369.
306. Physical characteristics in addition to “[c]onformity with race-based stereotypes and
behaviors, which were constructed through group-based social relations as well as the law,
[have] also determined [and continue to determine] one’s race.” Id.
307. The Supreme Court has categorized the use of race for the implementation of race-
conscious affirmative action and other race-conscious remedial measures as intentional race
discrimination. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). There-
fore, proffering evidence of one’s racial or ethnic identity may be relevant in the race-
conscious affirmative action context or when an individual allegedly misrepresents her race
in order to benefit from a race-conscious affirmative action program. See, e.g., Malone v. Civil
Serv. Comm’n, 646 N.E.2d 150 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995). Additionally, in Ricci v. DeStefano, the
Supreme Court announced that a governmental body’s consideration of race in its decision
not to certify promotional exam results, which disproportionately impacted African Ameri-
can firefighters and thus resulted in a negative employment decision for white male
firefighters and a Hispanic male firefighter, constitutes intentional race discrimination under
Title VII. See 557 U.S. 557, 592–93 (2009).
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made.”308 Therefore, in the Leonard case, whether the defendant
made an accurate assessment of the plaintiffs’ racial identity is irrel-
evant to the question of whether the plaintiffs were discriminated
against on the basis of race. What is relevant is whether the defen-
dant perceived the plaintiffs as Native American and barred them
from entering the restaurant on that ground. Thus, as the Leonard
court correctly notes, a focus on the defendant’s perceptions and
whether these perceptions generated the invidious, differential
treatment is the appropriate inquiry in categorical discrimination
cases.
Indeed, in the context of racial discrimination, the court in Per-
kins v. Lake County Department of Utilities explained that “subjective
perception of an individual’s race clearly plays an important role in
racial classification where discrimination is involved . . . [moreo-
ver,] [t]his court has never encountered an instance in which an
employer admittedly first checked the pedigree of an employee
before engaging in discriminatory conduct.”309 Thus, a court need
not check the racial, ethnic, or religious pedigree of a plaintiff in a
categorical discrimination case to ascertain whether a defendant’s
subjective perceptions about the plaintiff’s racial, ethnic, or relig-
ious identity motivated the defendant’s alleged discriminatory
treatment toward the plaintiff. Doing so is plainly wrong in not only
race, national origin, and religion discrimination cases, but in all
cases of invidious, differential treatment. It diverts attention from
the important question of whether a defendant’s perceptions about
an individual’s race, national origin, religion, color, or sex inspired
the discriminatory treatment to the irrelevant issue of whether an
individual can prove her identity.310
V. (MIS)PERCEPTIONS ARE PROTECTED UNDER TITLE VII
Within the federal judiciary, the adoption of an actuality require-
ment is a budding trend in misperception discrimination cases
308. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
309. Perkins v. Lake Cnty. Dep’t of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1273 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
310. The ineffective redress of disability discrimination, and thus the unintended conse-
quences of an actuality requirement, are best illustrated in the ADA context. In 2008,
Congress was forced to amend the ADA to overturn restrictive statutory interpretations on
the part of courts, which imposed onerous burdens on disability discrimination plaintiffs by
requiring them to prove that they suffered from an actual disability, leaving many individuals
whom Congress intended to cover unprotected under the Act. See Alex B. Long, Introducing
the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 217–24 (2008).
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arising under Title VII.311 Additionally, as the previous Part illus-
trated, some federal courts in conventionally framed discrimination
cases have even allowed an actuality defense, and, as a result, im-
posed an actuality requirement on plaintiffs. In so doing, courts
have ignored the central purposes of Title VII in part because of
the ADA’s “regarded as” language. This language has made it rela-
tively easy and facially logical for courts to argue that Title VII,
unlike the ADA, requires discrimination be based upon an individ-
ual’s actual protected status. Furthermore, adopting an actuality
requirement would be an easy enterprise for courts if they were not
provided with legal authority or EEOC guidance on the issue of
misperception discrimination.
However, this trend has not been universal. Certain federal
courts and the EEOC have resisted an anti-anticlassificationist inter-
pretation of Title VII, thereby refusing to impose an actuality
requirement.312 Yet, this alternative interpretation of Title VII is se-
verely marginalized within legal argument, opinions, and
scholarship. Consequently, this Article builds upon, as well as de-
parts from, the academic literature313 and jurisprudence specifically
addressing the viability of discrimination cases emanating from mis-
perceptions about an individual’s protected status. In the following
sections, in lieu of arguing for the transplantation of the ADA’s “re-
garded as” language to Title VII, this Article presents Title VII
jurisprudential support and EEOC directives to show that all indi-
viduals alleging categorical discrimination on the basis of Title VII’s
proscribed characteristics are already entitled to statutory protec-
tion and have standing to maintain a claim of discrimination,
regardless of whether their identity was correctly perceived.
311. Compare cases cited supra note 29 (adopting an actuality requirement), with cases
cited infra note 312 (declining to adopt an actuality requirement).
312. See Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1273 (declining to adopt an actuality requirement yet
adopting a reasonable basis test in a Title VII race/national origin discrimination case);
EEOC v. WC & M Enter., 496 F.3d 393, 401 (5th Cir. 2007); Boutros v. Avis Rent a Car Sys.,
LLC, No. 10-C-8196, 2013 WL 3834405, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2013); Henao v. Wyndham
Vacation Resorts, Inc., No. 10-00772 SOM/BMK, 2013 WL 704895, at *7 (D. Haw. Feb. 26,
2013) (citing EEOC v. WC & M Enterprises); Smith v. Specialty Pool Contractors, No. 02:07-
CV-1464, 2008 WL 4410163, at * 6 (W.D. Penn. Sept. 24, 2008) (citing Fogelman v. Mercy
Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir. 2002)); Wood v. Freeman Decorating Servs., Inc., No. 3:08-
CV-00375-LRH-RAM, 2010 WL 653764, at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 2010) (pronouncing that
“plaintiffs who are not members of [a] protected class have standing to challenge racially
discriminatory conduct in their own right when they are the direct target of discrimination”)
(quoting RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
Estate of Amos v. City of Page, 257 F.3d 1086, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2001))).
313. See Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 143; see also Senn, supra note 148; Charity
Williams, Misperceptions Matter: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Protects Employees from
Discrimination Based on Misperceived Religious Status, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 357 (2008).
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First, Section A examines underappreciated EEOC directives and
Fifth Circuit precedent in EEOC v. WC & M Enterprises, both of
which affirm that misperception discrimination cases are cogniza-
ble under Title VII. Section B further explores the ways in which
some courts have rejected an anti-anticlassificationist interpretation
of Title VII, independent of the EEOC’s guidelines on mispercep-
tion discrimination. Specifically, this Section revisits briefly Perkins
v. Lake County Department of Utilities and brings to the forefront an
often overlooked Third Circuit case, Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital, both
of which recognize the nexus between employer perception, bias,
and resulting discrimination in Title VII cases.
Lastly, Section C explains that the Supreme Court has implicitly
rejected an actuality requirement in Title VII cases and thus has
articulated a more cohesive notion of statutory protection in a re-
cent Title VII retaliation case, Thompson v. North American Stainless,
LP. In their offer of practical solutions within Title VII’s ambit, the
following sections cover new and important ground towards ex-
tending protection to all victims of invidious, differential treatment
on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, or sex.
A. Protection for Misperception Discrimination Plaintiffs: EEOC v.
WC & M Enterprises and Longstanding EEOC Directives
1. EEOC Directives
For over thirty years, the EEOC has issued interpretive directives
on matters of employment discrimination involving misperception.
Only the Fifth Circuit and a few other federal courts have expressly
taken note of such directives in Title VII misperception discrimina-
tion cases.314 In concluding that references to national origin
directed at the plaintiff are sufficient to establish a prima facie case
of national origin discrimination, the Fifth Circuit relied upon the
EEOC Guidelines published in 1980, which state:
[i]n order to have a claim of national origin discrimination
under Title VII, it is not necessary to show that the alleged
discriminator knew the particular national origin group to
which the complainant belonged. [To prove a national origin
314. See, e.g., EEOC v. WC & M Enter., 496 F.3d 393, 401 (5th Cir. 2007); Henao v. Wynd-
ham Vacation Resorts, Inc., No. 10-00772 SOM/BMK, 2013 WL 704895, at *7 (D. Haw. Feb.
26, 2013).
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claim], it is enough to show that the claimant was treated dif-
ferently than others because of his or her foreign accent,
appearance, or physical characteristics.315
In 2002, the EEOC reinforced its earlier guidance by enumerat-
ing that unlawful national origin discrimination under Title VII
embodies:
[e]mployment discrimination against an individual based on
the employer’s belief that he is a member of a particular na-
tional origin group, for example, discrimination against
someone perceived as being Arab based on his speech, man-
nerisms, and appearance, regardless of how he identifies himself or
whether he is, in fact, of Arab ethnicity.316
However, the EEOC did not simply limit its guidance on mis-
perceptions to the context of national origin discrimination. The
EEOC has specifically stated in its Compliance Manual that unlaw-
ful race discrimination under Title VII constitutes “discrimination
against an individual based on a belief that the individual is a mem-
ber of a particular racial group, regardless of how the individual
identifies himself. Discrimination against an individual based on a
perception of his or her race violates Title VII even if that perception is
wrong.”317 In light of increased workplace religious, ethnic, and ra-
cial discrimination post-9/11, the EEOC fortified its position that
discrimination claims resulting from misperceptions about an indi-
vidual’s racial, religious, or ethnic identity are cognizable under
Title VII. According to EEOC guidelines issued in 2002 in response
to post-9/11 discrimination, Title VII prohibits “[h]arassing or oth-
erwise discriminating because of the perception or belief that a
person is a member of a particular racial, national origin, or relig-
ious group whether or not that perception is correct.”318
315. WC & M Enter., 496 F.3d at 401. (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 85632, 85633 (Dec. 29,
1980)) (emphasis in original).
316. EEOC Compl. Man. § 13-II(B) (2002) (emphasis added).
317. EEOC Compl. Man. § 15-II (2006) (emphasis added).
318. Employment Discrimination Based on Religion, Ethnicity, or Country of Origin, U.S. EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/fs-relig_ethnic.cfm (last visited Aug.
2, 2013) (emphasis added). The EEOC has also expressed in its official publication, which
provides guidance to employers on complying with the various antidiscrimination laws the
agency enforces, that discrimination based on misperceptions about an individual’s race con-
stitutes unlawful discrimination under Title VII. According to the EEOC, “discrimination
[occurs] against an individual based on a belief that the individual is a member of a particu-
lar racial group, regardless of how the individual identifies himself. Discrimination against an
individual based on a perception of his or her race violates Title VII even if that perception is
wrong.” EEOC Compl. Man. § 15-II (2006) (emphasis added). The EEOC provides parallel
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Accordingly, the EEOC has announced repeatedly that the ex-
tension of Title VII protection to race, religion, and national origin
discrimination is not contingent upon a plaintiff’s showing that the
alleged discrimination was induced by her actual racial, religious,
or ethnic identity. Instead, a plaintiff is protected when race, relig-
ion, or national origin is the basis for a covered employer’s
invidious, differential treatment. In its directives on religious, na-
tional origin, and racial discrimination, the EEOC acknowledges
the nexus between employer perceptions of an individual’s identity
and the actualization of invidious, differential treatment. Further-
more, according to the EEOC, the plaintiff need not demonstrate
that the employer is aware of the plaintiff’s self-ascribed racial, eth-
nic, or religious identity, nor must the plaintiff demonstrate that
her identity comports with the employer’s perception in order to
assert an actionable claim of discrimination.
2. EEOC v. WC & M Enterprises
In its prosecution of a Title VII case in EEOC v. WC & M Enter-
prises, the EEOC presented its above regulations on misperception
discrimination to the Fifth Circuit, which proved to be influential to
the successful outcome of the case.319 The plaintiff-intervenor,
Mohommed Rafiq, like Foad Afshar,320 alleged that beginning Sep-
tember 11, 2001 and lasting until the end of his employment, he
experienced post-9/11 discrimination.321 Specifically, he contended
that he experienced harassment because of his religion and na-
tional origin in violation of Title VII. Rafiq, born in India, was a
practicing Muslim.322 According to Rafiq, upon reporting to work
on the afternoon of September 11th, his co-workers and supervisors
were watching media reports of the terrorist attacks and inquired
sarcastically about his whereabouts prior to his arrival. Rafiq felt as
if “[his] supervisors and colleagues were implying that [he] had
participated in some way in the terrorist attacks against the United
States.”323 Thereafter, his co-workers and supervisors repeatedly
guidance for national origin discrimination. See EEOC Comp. Man. § 13-II(B) (2002) (“Em-
ployment discrimination against an individual based on the employer’s belief that he is a
member of a particular national origin group, for example, discrimination against someone
perceived as being Arab based on his speech, mannerisms, and appearance, regardless of
how he identifies himself or whether he is, in fact, of Arab ethnicity.”).
319. 496 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2007).
320. See supra Part II.A.
321. 496 F.3d at 396–97.
322. Id. at 396.
323. Id.
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called him “Taliban” despite his requests that they cease doing so
and his complaints to management. According to Rafiq, he was sub-
jected to mocking inquiries and comments about his Islamic faith
and religious practices.324
Furthermore, on numerous occasions, Rafiq’s supervisors and co-
workers allegedly called him “Arab.”325 Rafiq also recalled an inci-
dent when, allegedly after inquiring about his mandatory
attendance at a United Way event, his supervisor responded, “This
is America. That’s the way things work over here. This is not the
Islamic country where you come from.”326 His supervisor issued a
written reprimand stating that Rafiq was acting like a “Muslim ex-
tremist” and he could no longer work with him due to his “militant
stance.”327 Days later, Rafiq reported to management another
harassing altercation involving a different supervisor. Two days after
issuing his complaint, Rafiq was terminated.328
Rafiq sued his former employer on the basis of religion and na-
tional origin discrimination in violation of Title VII, and the EEOC
decided to litigate Rafiq’s case on his behalf.329 Similar to other fed-
eral district courts in misperception discrimination cases, the court
granted the defendant-employer’s summary judgment motion with
respect to Rafiq’s national origin discrimination claim.330
Like Burrage, El, and a series of other federal district court
cases,331 the court held in WC & M Enterprises that the EEOC could
not assert a national origin discrimination claim because none of
the alleged harassing comments referred to Rafiq’s actual birth-
place of India.332 However, on appeal, the Fifth Circuit overruled
the district court’s conclusion that actuality is required in Title VII
intentional discrimination cases. The Fifth Circuit declared that “a
party is able to establish a discrimination claim [under Title VII]
based on its own national origin even though the discriminatory acts do
not identify the victim’s actual country of origin.”333 The Fifth Circuit
deferred to the EEOC’s longstanding guidance on national origin
324. Id.






331. See cases cited supra note 29.
332. EEOC v. WC & M Enter., Inc., No. Civ.A. H-04-3372, 2005 WL 2106090, at *4 (S.D.
Tex. 2005) (holding that the EEOC’s national origin discrimination claim failed as a matter
of law because none of the comments referring to Rafiq’s national origin specifically targeted
India, Rafiq’s birthplace).
333. WC & M Enter., 496 F.3d at 401 (emphasis added).
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discrimination334 and held that alleged derogatory comments re-
lated to national origin, or rather the alleged statements specifically
referencing co-workers’ and supervisors’ perception (or mispercep-
tion) of Rafiq’s country of origin, were sufficient to assert a
cognizable claim of national origin discrimination.335
The Eleventh Circuit recently endorsed the Fifth Circuit’s hold-
ing by observing that “a harasser’s use of epithets associated with a
different ethnic or racial minority than the plaintiff will not neces-
sarily shield an employer from liability for a hostile work
environment.”336 The fact that two federal courts of appeal have
taken seriously the EEOC’s guidelines on misperception discrimi-
nation and rejected an anti-anticlassificationist interpretation of
Title VII suggests that this will be the natural disposition of courts
when deciding future misperception discrimination cases. How-
ever, as previously discussed, a number of federal district courts and
at least one federal court of appeals have adopted an antithetical
posture, which other courts may be inclined to follow.337 Conse-
quently, divergent readings of Title VII’s scope and meaning in
misperception discrimination cases within the federal judiciary
have produced a legal tension (that may soon engender a federal
circuit split), which is in need of a resolution.
B. Employer Perception Animates Employment Discrimination: Perkins v.
Lake County Department of Utilities and Fogleman v.
Mercy Hospital
Independent of the EEOC’s guidance and express protection
against misperception discrimination, a couple of courts have ex-
plicitly recognized the relationship between invidious, differential
treatment aimed at a discrimination plaintiff and the employer per-
ceptions that motivate it.338 This Section examines those decisions
334. See also Eriksen v. Allied Waste Sys., Inc., No. 06-13549, 2007 WL 1003851, at *6 (E.D.
Mich. April 2, 2007) (relying on the EEOC’s guidance to conclude that “national origin
discrimination is not based on the actual national origin of the plaintiff, but rather on the
perceived characteristics of the plaintiff leading the alleged discriminator to treat the plain-
tiff differently”).
335. WC & M Enter., 496 F.3d at 401–03.
336. Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1299 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing WC & M
Enter., 496 F.3d at 401).
337. See supra text accompanying note 29.
338. See, e.g., Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561 (3d Cir. 2002) (adopting a
perception theory in Title VII cases); see also Smith v. Specialty Pool Contractors, No. 02:07-
CV-1464, 2008 WL 4410163, at * 6 (W.D. Penn. Sept. 24, 2008) (adopting the Third Circuit’s
perception theory in Fogleman to allow a Title VII plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim
based upon his perceived religious identity).
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by briefly revisiting Perkins v. Lake County Department of Utilities339 and
introducing a notable Third Circuit case, Fogleman v. Mercy Hospi-
tal.340 Recall that in Perkins v. Lake County Department of Utilities, the
plaintiff contended that he was discriminated against because he
was Native American, and the defendant-employer raised an actual-
ity defense, claiming that the plaintiff did not assert an actionable
race/national origin claim because he was not actually Native
American.341 The federal district court in Ohio declined to adopt
an actuality requirement and, thus, refused to mandate the adjudi-
cation of the plaintiff’s race.342 In so doing, the Perkins court
explained that it was “unnecessary, and indeed inappropriate, to
attempt to measure [the plaintiff’s] percentage of Indian blood or
to examine his documentable connection to recognized existing
tribes” for the maintenance of the plaintiff’s categorical race dis-
crimination case.343
Essentially, the Perkins court affirmed that an anti-anticlassifica-
tionist interpretation of Title VII (which would later be adopted by
some courts in parallel contexts) is inconsistent with the aims of
Title VII and the operation of discrimination. The court noted that,
in its experience deciding employment discrimination cases, it had
“never encountered an instance in which an employer admittedly
first checked the pedigree of an employee before engaging in dis-
criminatory conduct.”344 Accordingly, the court found it
incongruous for the plaintiff to first prove that he was actually Na-
tive American in a case alleging invidious, differential treatment.345
The court reasoned that antidiscrimination legislation like Title VII
sought “to equalize the footing of all employees without regard to
the employer’s subjective perceptions and preconceived ideas”346
rather than provide benefits on the basis of race, sex, national ori-
gin, religion, and color.347
339. 860 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
340. 283 F.3d 561.
341. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1278.
342. Id.
343. Id. But see Leonard v. Katsinas, No. 05-1069, 2007 WL 1106136 (C.D. Ill. April 11,
2007) (requiring racial discrimination plaintiffs to prove that they were Native American for
an actionable § 1981 claim); supra Part IV.B.
344. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1273.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 1278 (emphasis added).
347. Again, the Perkins court adopted a reasonable basis test which mandates that a plain-
tiff proffer objective evidence that supports the notion that the employer reasonably believed
that the plaintiff was a member of a protected category. Id. According to the court, an “objec-
tive basis may consist of physical appearance, language, cultural activities, or associations, so
long as any or all of those objective factors lead the employer to believe that a given em-
ployee is a member of that protected class, and to deal with him/her on that basis.” Id. I
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In Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital, the Third Circuit similarly rejected
an anti-anticlassificationist interpretation of antidiscrimination leg-
islation, recognizing the interactive nature between subjective
perceptions, related bias or stereotypes, and resulting invidious, dif-
ferential treatment. In Fogleman, the plaintiff alleged that his former
employer retaliated against him in violation of two federal antidis-
crimination statutes, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).348 He
also alleged that his employer violated a state antidiscrimination
statute.349 Fogleman and his father worked together for the
defendant-employer for fifteen years.350 Fogleman’s father alleged
in a separate lawsuit against the defendant-employer that he was
unlawfully terminated because of his age and disability. Subse-
quently, the defendant-employer terminated Fogleman (the son).
contend, however, that satisfying the court’s reasonable basis test is not as simple as it seems.
To maintain a Title VII race or national origin discrimination case, the objective characteris-
tics that a plaintiff would rely upon are not objective but rather determined subjectively,
relationally, and contextually and thus are contestable. For example, an individual who self-
identifies as Native American could describe her skin color as light brown, one observer
could describe the individual’s skin color as medium brown and characterize her as Hispanic,
and another observer could describe the same individual as having a fair skin color and
characterize her as white. Plausibly, the two observers may not find the respective opinion of
the other a reasonable assessment of the individual’s skin color and race. But see Davison,
supra note 269, at 184 (endorsing the Perkins court’s reasonable belief requirement by rea-
soning “it avoids the complicated and often indeterminate task of establishing a plaintiff’s
actual racial background”). Furthermore, the Perkins court’s rationale for a reasonable basis
test in race discrimination cases is grounded in a fixed, physical construction of indigeneity
and Blackness. See Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1278 & n.20. For additional commentary on the
Perkins court’s express ruminations on the static and immutable physicality of Blackness, see
Greene, supra note 220, at 184.
348. Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 564 (3d Cir. 2002).
349. Id. at 564.  The ADA and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) contain
parallel anti-retaliation provisions to Title VII. The ADA’s anti-retaliation provision states:
No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has op-
posed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 503, 104 Stat. 327, 370 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006)).
The ADEA also makes it an unlawful employment practice:
for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because such individ-
ual . . . has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because such
individual . . . has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this Act.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 4(d), 81 Stat. 602, 603
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006)).
350. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d. at 564.
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As a result, the junior Fogleman sued, alleging that he was unlaw-
fully retaliated against because of his father’s protected activity (i.e.,
initiating legal causes of action under applicable antidiscrimination
statutes).351
Fogleman argued that even though he had not engaged in pro-
tected activity, like opposing the alleged discrimination against his
father or participating in his father’s lawsuit, he was still protected
against retaliation under the applicable antidiscrimination statutes
because his employer “perceived him to be so engaged.”352 The
Third Circuit concluded that the statutory language of the relevant
antidiscrimination laws directly supported Fogleman’s perception
theory and held that if “[Fogleman] can show, as he claims, that
adverse action was taken against him because [the defendant-em-
ployer] thought he was assisting his father and thereby engaging in
protected activity, it does not matter whether [the defendant’s] per-
ception was factually correct.”353 According to the Fogelman court,
antidiscrimination statutes like Title VII “focus on the employer’s
subjective reasons for taking adverse action against an employee, so it
matters not whether the reasons behind the employer’s discrimina-
tory animus are actually correct as a factual matter.”354 Accordingly,
in order to assert a cognizable claim under antidiscrimination stat-
utes, a retaliation plaintiff does not have to satisfy an actuality
requirement. That is, the plaintiff need not actually oppose an em-
ployer’s discriminatory practice or participate in a proceeding
related to alleged unlawful discrimination.
In rejecting an actuality requirement for retaliation plaintiffs, the
Third Circuit analogized Fogleman’s case to the following hypo-
thetical situation:
[i]magine a Title VII discrimination case in which an em-
ployer refuses to hire a prospective employee because he
thinks that the applicant is Muslim. The employer is still dis-
criminating on the basis of religion even if the applicant is not in
fact a Muslim. What is relevant is that the applicant, whether
Muslim or not, was treated worse than he otherwise would
have been for reasons prohibited by the statute.355
These factual scenarios are eerily reminiscent of the mispercep-
tion discrimination cases El and Afshar, in which courts expressly
351. Id.
352. Id. at 571.
353. Id. at 571–72.
354. Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
355. Id. (emphasis added).
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rejected the application of a perception theory.356 Yet, the Third
Circuit reasoned that employer perceptions are integral to the man-
ifestation of discrimination. In doing so, the Third Circuit
delineated that a plaintiff whom an employer allegedly mis-
perceives as engaging in protected activity maintains an actionable
claim of discrimination, just like a plaintiff against whom an em-
ployer discriminates because of a misperception that she is Muslim.
For the Third Circuit, a showing of actuality in discrimination cases
arising under the substantive and anti-retaliation provisions of an-
tidiscrimination laws like Title VII is categorically wrong.
Consequently, in Title VII intentional discrimination cases, courts
have relied upon the Third Circuit’s logic to conclude that a plain-
tiff asserted a cognizable claim of discrimination.357 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit’s holding in EEOC v. WC & M Enterprises, the Third Circuit’s
reasoning in Fogleman, and the EEOC’s guidance solidify that assert-
ing a remediable claim of unlawful discrimination is not contingent
upon a plaintiff’s demonstration that an employer discriminated
against her because of her actual protected status.
C. Towards Title VII Protection for all “Persons Aggrieved” by
Categorical Discrimination: Thompson v.
American Stainless, LP
The previous sections have demonstrated that the actuality re-
quirement is not an inherent or stable prerequisite for Title VII
protection. This Section argues that an intentional discrimination
plaintiff need not satisfy an actuality requirement to seek redress
for an alleged unlawful practice under Title VII. As previously dis-
cussed in Part I, Title VII provides that “persons aggrieved” may
seek statutory protection and relief. Yet, Congress did not define
which individuals are “persons aggrieved” by practices proscribed
under the Act, such as race, color, sex, national origin, and color
356. See supra Parts II–III.
357. See, e.g., Smith v. Specialty Pool Contractors, No. 02:07-CV-1464, 2008 WL 4410163,
at *6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2008).
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discrimination;358 by retaliation for opposing unlawful discrimina-
tion on these grounds; or by retaliation for participation in
proceedings related to such discrimination.359
However, in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, the Su-
preme Court demarcated the scope of Title VII’s “persons
aggrieved” language.360 Under similar factual circumstances to
Fogleman, the Court concluded that the plaintiff in Thompson al-
leged a cognizable claim of retaliation on different, yet related,
grounds.361 The petitioner, Thompson, and his fiancée worked si-
multaneously for the defendant-employer.362 Thompson’s fiancée
sued the defendant-employer for sex discrimination under Title
VII. Three weeks later, the defendant-employer terminated Thomp-
son. According to Thompson, even though he did not engage in
statutorily protected activity (e.g., Thompson did not file a claim of
discrimination nor did he oppose the discrimination his fiancée al-
legedly experienced), Thompson’s former employer terminated
him in retaliation against his fiancée because of her protected con-
duct. Therefore, Thompson’s termination constituted unlawful
retaliation under Title VII.363
The Supreme Court interpreted Title VII’s “persons aggrieved”
language to hold that Thompson’s retaliation claim was actionable
under the statute. The court pronounced that “the term ‘aggrieved’
in Title VII . . . enable[s] [a] suit by any plaintiff with an interest
‘arguably [sought] to be protected by [Title VII ],’ while excluding
358. Congress also did not define the term “discrimination.” This Article demonstrates
that the term discrimination was primarily intended to cover invidious, differential treat-
ment. However, the Supreme Court has also interpreted unlawful intentional discrimination
or disparate treatment to envelop an employer’s benign consideration of a protected classifi-
cation in an employment decision that infringes upon the legitimate expectations of an
employee. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 583 (2009). See also Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 78–83 (1977), wherein the Supreme Court held that an em-
ployer’s duty to accommodate an employee’s religious observances and practices cannot
override other employees’ legitimate expectations established pursuant to a non-discrimina-
tory collective bargaining agreement or other valid employment contract. The court
reasoned that accommodating one employee’s religious obligations by denying another em-
ployee her shift preferences and depriving the employee her contractual rights under a
collective bargaining agreement constitutes “unequal treatment” or discrimination that “Ti-
tle VII does not contemplate.” Id. at 81.
359. See supra Part I.
360. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 863 (2011).
361. It is important to note that Thompson did not advance the perception theory the
Third Circuit adopted in Fogleman. But see Gerri L. Plain, I’ll Get You My Pretty . . . and Your
Little Associate Too—the Expansion of Employee Protection in Title VII Retaliation Claims, 42 CUMB.
L. REV. 549, 564 (2012) (positing that the Supreme Court implicitly adopted the perception
theory in Thompson).
362. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 867.
363. Id.
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plaintiffs . . . whose interests are unrelated to the statutory prohibi-
tions in Title VII.”364 Moreover, the Court reasoned that Thompson
was a person aggrieved with standing to sue his former employer
for unlawful retaliation because he was not an “accidental victim” of
the employer’s retaliatory animus against his fiancée.365  According
to the court:
injuring [Thompson] was the employer’s intended means of
harming [Thompson’s fiancée]. Hurting him was the unlawful
act by which the employer punished her. In those circum-
stances, we think Thompson well within the zone of interests
sought to be protected by Title VII. He is a person aggrieved
with standing to sue.366
The Court allowed Thompson to maintain his retaliation action
even though he did not actually engage in protected activity. In do-
ing so, the Supreme Court, like the Third Circuit in Fogleman,
implicitly denounced a showing of actuality as a prerequisite to
maintain a Title VII action. Therefore, at a minimum, an individual
who alleges that she is the victim of a covered employer’s categori-
cal discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics or
protected conduct is a “person aggrieved” under Title VII and has
standing to sue. In both instances, such plaintiffs are asserting
claims that clearly fall “within the zone of interests protected by
Title VII.”367 Thus, to maintain an action under Title VII, plaintiffs
need not demonstrate that a covered employer’s invidious, differ-
ential treatment was animated by their actual protected status or
protected activity. Plaintiffs must allege that they suffered categori-
cal discrimination on Title VII’s proscribed grounds.
Unequivocally, a categorical discrimination plaintiff contends
that she suffered employment-related harms of central importance
to Congress when it enacted Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Plaintiffs in misperception and conventionally framed discrimina-
tion cases are asserting parallel claims “within the zone of interests
protected by Title VII,”368 in that they are seeking to remedy invidi-
ous, differential treatment on the basis of Title VII’s proscribed
characteristics. Furthermore, plaintiffs like Mr. Burrage, Mr. El, Mr.
364. Id. at 870 (emphasis added) (quoting Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank
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Afshar, and Mr. Butler, who experience invidious, differential treat-
ment because of their misperceived identities, are no more
accidental victims of an employer’s categorical discrimination than
plaintiffs alleging discrimination because of their self-ascribed iden-
tities. Rather, both sets of plaintiffs are intended victims369 of
discrimination that emanated from the employer’s perceptions
about their race, religion, color, sex, or national origin.
These individuals are “persons aggrieved” and therefore entitled
to Title VII protection.  They should not be forced to satisfy an actu-
ality requirement to vindicate their rights to be free from
discrimination in the workplace. Indeed, the plain language of Ti-
tle VII,370 Supreme Court, Fifth Circuit, and Third Circuit
precedent, and longstanding EEOC directives, affirm that an actu-
ality requirement is not a prerequisite for Title VII protection.
Thus, the deployment of an anti-anticlassificationist interpretation
and an attendant actuality requirement in categorical discrimina-
tion cases is categorically wrong and should be ceased.
CONCLUSION
This Article unearths an alarming movement within antidis-
crimination law, theory, and praxis. Some courts have employed an
anti-anticlassificationist interpretation of Title VII in misperception
and conventionally framed discrimination cases and, in the process,
have imposed upon plaintiffs an unnecessary actuality requirement
before they can benefit from Title VII protection. Per some federal
courts, plaintiffs in misperception discrimination cases are automat-
ically deemed unprotected because the discriminatory treatment
they suffer is not on the basis of their actual protected status. The
imposition of an actuality requirement in conventionally framed
discrimination cases has afforded employers a minimalist actuality
defense to escape Title VII’s requirements and imposed upon plain-
tiffs an onerous burden to prove their actual identity in order to
maintain their case when their identity is challenged. Neither of
these developments addresses the central issue in Title VII inten-
tional discrimination cases: whether an individual suffered
369. See id. (holding that the plaintiff who did not engage in protected conduct but was
allegedly terminated because of his fiancée’s protected activity was a “person aggrieved with
standing to sue” his former employer under Title VII because he was “not an accidental
victim of . . . the employer’s unlawful act”).
370. Title VII’s statutory language provides that an employer violates the Act when a
plaintiff “demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice.” 42 U.S. C § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
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invidious, differential treatment on the basis of race, color, national
origin, religion or sex.
Therefore, courts’ anti-anticlassificationist statutory interpreta-
tion is categorically wrong: it defies human categorization, ignores
the innate interaction between individual perception and resulting
discrimination, and deprives discrimination plaintiffs of the very
protection against categorical discrimination that Title VII is meant
to provide. Indeed, rather than protecting individuals against invid-
ious, differential treatment engaged in by covered employers,
courts’ anti-anticlassificationist interpretation of Title VII fosters ir-
remediable race, color, sex, national origin, and religious
discrimination in the workplace. Thus, the continued reification of
an actuality requirement in intentional discrimination cases must
cease before Title VII’s meaning, purpose, and protection are fur-
ther impaired. Towards that end, in its presentation of Third
Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Supreme Court jurisprudence, Title VII’s
statutory language, and the EEOC’s interpretive guidance, this Arti-
cle firmly establishes that all individuals who suffer categorical
discrimination at the hands of a covered employer on the basis of
race, color, sex, national origin, or religion—regardless of whether
the discriminatory treatment emanates from their self-ascribed or
mistaken identity—are protected under Title VII.
